Tuesday, December 17, 2013

Stop Prawer-Begin plan for Bedouin resettlement, by Devorah Brous, Jewish Journal of Greater Los Angeles

Women stand near a washing line in the Bedouin town of Rahat in southern Israel on Dec. 10. Photo by Amir Cohen/Reuters
Women stand near a washing line in the Bedouin town of Rahat in southern Israel on Dec. 10. Photo by Amir Cohen/Reuters caption


Published in the Jewish Journal of Greater Los Angeles, December 14, 2013
 
By Devorah Brous, Founder and former Executive Director Bustan, former co-director of the Campaign for Bedouin-Jewish Justice
 
The Negev Bedouin village of Umm el-Hiran is where I first learned about what it means to be rooted, to be devoted to something with steadfastness. It is here that I learned the true impact of Jewish National Fund (JNF) afforestation on the Bedouin, which is far from JNF’s whitewashed and spit-shined-glossy version. Rayid Abu Alkeean, an Israeli Bedouin, partnered with Bustan, an environmental justice organization that I founded, to host delegations on dozens of our Negev Unplugged Tours in his village, where we learned about Bedouin traditional life unplugged from the nation’s electricity grid, and from Israel’s democracy.

Imagine serving in the Israel Defense Forces and having your home demolished by the government in front of your children. Next, imagine being billed for the demolition. Imagine watching religious Jews building a barbed wire fence to stake a claim to the hilltop just above your home. Hiran and Kasif, two Jewish-only religious towns slated to be built on the lands of Rayid’s village, were just approved.

Fortunately, the Knesset vote on the controversial Prawer-Begin Plan to resettle the Negev Bedouin has been postponed for the next one to two months. We must urge Israeli officials to take this discriminatory plan off the table and encourage them to adopt the Alternative Master Plan (AMP) developed by Bedouin leadership and Jewish planners of the human rights non-governmental organization Bimkom. The AMP will delimit territorial boundaries on historical village lands. It will enable formal village planning and access to the full basket of rights and services afforded Jewish villages and towns — housing, clinics, roads, waste removal and schools. We must make every effort to advance this alternative plan and promote sustainable economic development for all residents of the Negev.

Here’s why it is in the best interest of every Jew in the Negev and the Diaspora to stop the Prawer Plan.

• Because it is morally unconscionable to uproot this Negev Arab minority from their homes and against their will.

• Because token symbolic gestures aimed at recognition, such as granting formal ownership over less than 2 percent of historic Bedouin lands to some while denying the rest to the vast majority of others, simply won’t work. The Prawer Plan will dispossess some 40,000 Bedouin, requiring entire villages to be demolished wholesale.

• Because squeezing the remaining lands that have not yet been confiscated from the Bedouin population and urging them to live as neighbors with Jewish homesteaders and families that replace them will deepen already existing social cleavages.

• Because it will lead to violence. Today the youth in Bedouin villages act on behalf of a civilian population of 200,000 Negev Arabs that has been marginalized, criminalized and pauperized for decades. “Days of Rage” protests and vigils are surging to increasingly high levels of tension in what is now front and center stage of Israel’s ongoing land conflict. By declaring a civilian population a national security threat, the government further alienates and even catalyzes an already enraged and disenfranchised minority into the streets. Many believe that despite the intentions of community elders to organize nonviolently, there is no further incentive to do so.

• Because living off the grid is hard, but the unrecognized Bedouin prefer that to losing their lands. Most “unrecognized villagers” have consistently resisted running water and electricity to power their computers and washing machines, preferring to stay on their lands rather than be holed up in cities with different and sometimes clashing familial clans, and pushed into wage labor —– when it is even available — at the expense of their traditional cultural pursuits. Unrecognized Bedouin have organized however haphazardly and have used nonviolent but futile tactics to have their land rights recognized by the Israeli courts. More than 100,000 Bedouin continue to resist being transferred into impoverished townships that are drug-riddled pits of crime. They fight to keep their lands because even in recognized towns, Bedouin are denied building permits, basic infrastructure and services.

• Because we’ve learned from villages like Al-Arakib and Umm el-Hiran, among others, that coercion is not sustainable. To try to rip Negev Arabs from their lands will only make them, and more of us, more resolute.

• Because the northern Negev is already a toxic tinderbox. Most Negev Arabs and Bedouin have been relocated into a triangle of territory in the northern Negev between Beer-Sheva, Arad and Dimona that has been zoned to encircle them  to prevent further construction.

The conflict between Bedouin and the State of Israel is about land, resources and control. Investment in developing Jewish towns and demolishing Arab villages happens most aggressively in Arab areas of the Negev and the Galilee, battlefields of Israel’s demographic war to create a Jewish majority in every region of Israel.  One tactic is to break apart contiguous Bedouin villages and to concentrate the maximum number of Bedouin onto the minimum amount of territory.

Like Rayid, head of the village council of al-Sira, Khalil el Amor resists the Prawer Plan. His entire village is slated for demolition. I spoke with Khalil yesterday. He said, “I am a teacher, and finishing school to become a lawyer. As a child, I would return home from school to tend our flock and help my mother milk the animals until dark. I would light a lantern and start my homework. I want my granddaughter Siraj (meaning “lantern”) to have the choice to tend a flock. If I stay on my village lands, I dream of inviting tourists to learn about our traditions and our changing Bedouin culture.” Rather than give up the land, and give up the lantern, Khalil holds steadfast.

The AMP is a viable way for Negev Arabs like Khalil and Rayid to showcase their village culture to tourists and to earn livable incomes rather than masquerading as traditional Bedouin for Jewish-owned tourist companies that romanticize their culture if they’ll pretend to be shepherds for a photo-op on a camel. If Prawer passes, that is all our children will know about Bedouin culture.
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Wednesday, November 14, 2012

The Back Story to My Op-Ed “Mr. President, Give Mideast Peace One More Chance” in Open Zion/The Daily Beast


In “Mr. President, Give Mideast Peace One More Chance,” at Open Zion/The Daily Beast,  I respond to Tom Friedman, Peter Beinart and others who say that Obama won’t pursue Israeli-Palestinian peace during his second term unless there is a radical change on the Israeli or Palestinians sides.

1.  On the impact of a new Netanyahu/Lieberman right-wing government: 

A.    Lieberman’s “joining up with Likud's radical, anti-liberal wing…means that in the next Knesset, there will be an escalation of anti-democratic legislation. Minorities will be pushed down. The opposition will be silenced. The media will be exhausted, …” wrote Nahum Barnea in Yediot last week.
B.     “From now on, all citizens should know that when they put the slip bearing the letters of the unified [Likud-Beiteinu] party in the ballot box, they are voting for a platform that seeks to hold onto the [occupied] territories no matter what, to perpetuate discrimination against the Arabs within Israel's borders, to reject any chance for reconciliation with the Palestinians, and to face off against the world on the false pretense of Israel's welfare. They are also voting to institute an anti-liberal regime within the state and a harsh occupation policy within the territories, and to steep Israel even more in an atmosphere of nationalist indoctrination,”  warned Uzi Benziman in Ha’aretz.
C.     Former Israeli intelligence officials and Middle East experts have informed Netanyahu that continued “construction in Israeli West Bank settlements without diplomatic progress” towards peace could “trigger a violent uprising in the West Bank.”
2.      How a center-left bloc, under the possible leadership of Olmert (or Peres), could end up drawing more Knesset seats than the Likud-Yisrael Beiteinu union, with enough seats to form a moderate government that could revive moribund Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, advance social justice, and halt the erosion of democratic values in Israel.
Even now before the new center-left bloc has been formed, center and left Zionist parties together have polled a total of 45 seats, while the new Likud-Beiteinu union has polled as low as 35 seats, down from its present 42.   A Channel 10 poll gave Labor 23, Yesh Atid 13, Kadima 5, and Meretz 4, totaling 45.  The Likud-Yisrael Beiteinu bloc would receive between 35 and 42.    With Shas expected to receive 14 seats, under current projections, Olmert or Peres may well be able to coopt Shas under Aryeh Deri to form a 59-seat coalition, close but not yet enough to cross the majority threshold of 61.
But with the Arab parties, which are slated to receive 10 or 11 seats, the center-left could form a “blocking majority” that would be able to prevent Netanayahu and Lieberman from forming a government, enabling the center-left bloc to form the government.   In addition, the center-left bloc’s seats could grow and Likud Beiteinu’s may drop after the center-left parties and their leadership lists are fully formed, with Olmert’s return to the scene, and win the endorsement of a number of “security heavyweights” who will also help undermine confidence in Netanyahu.   (See also, “Haaretz poll: A Livni-Olmert-Lapid 'super-party' would outscore Likud:  If the center and the left together could garner 61 seats, it would deprive Netanyahu of the ability to form a majority government,” Ha’aretz, Oct. 18, 2012)
In fact, the most recent Channel 10 poll (Ha'aretz, Nov. 14, 2012) shows Likud/Yisrael Beiteinu dropping from its current 42 seats in the Knesset to just 36.
As Leslie Susser points out in the Jerusalem Report:  “Stav Shaffir, one of the [social] protest leaders, has already announced that she will run for a place on the Labor list. The big test for Yachimovich will be whether she can deliver a wider message, and bring in new high profile people, ex-generals or diplomats, to bolster her limited security-diplomatic credentials. Success for her, coupled with a strong centrist showing, could help the center-left together with the Arab parties achieve a blocking majority and a chance to form the next government. Together, they have 55 seats in the current Knesset, so it would take a six seat or five percent (around 200,000 votes) swing to obtain a blocking majority.”  (The Netanyahu Gambit,10/16/2012)
Of course, many things could go wrong to derail a center-left government from taking power under Olmert, such as the remaining corruption charges still pending against Olmert, or just plain old fashioned losing the election to Netanyahu and Lieberman.  See for example:  An Olmert comeback: The center-left cursed by a blessing:   Though the former prime minister has long been touted as the great white hope of the center-left, too many undecided factors blight his potential return,” Anshel Pfeffer, Ha’aretz, Nov.13, 2012.
But the center-left has a chance to win this time around, and President Obama should revive credible Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts in the coming weeks to avert the crisis which is likely to follow Palestinian recognition as an observer state at the UN, because it is the best policy for the U.S. and for Israelis and Palestinians themselves.   By doing so, he might also give an inadvertent lift to the center-left parties in Israel’s upcoming election, without appearing to play a partisan role in Israeli politics, thus making it more likely that Israeli-Palestinian negotiations will bear fruit this time.

Tuesday, July 10, 2012

How Pinkwashing Critics Go Wrong: Why I oppose the new move to boycott Israel


Advocates of boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS) have ratcheted up charges that Israel and American LGBT groups are attempting to “pinkwash,” or deflect attention from, Israel’s mistreatment of Palestinians by mounting programs in the US about the country’s many gay rights achievements.  BDS forces in the anti-pinkwashing campaign call for boycotting events with visiting Israeli Jewish LGBT activists, even succeeding in shutting down several recent events in Seattle.  
 
Arthur Slepian is a gay American Jew who founded a group called A Wider Bridge, which seeks to build stronger ties between the LGBT communities of Israel and North America.  A Wider Bridge was the lead sponsor of the Israeli LGBT leaders’ two-week West Coast visit with their American counterparts.
Slepian has just published a landmark essay in Tikkun,An Inconvenient Truth: the Myths of Pinkwashing,” now the single most-read article in Tikkun online.   Read it here

His essay explodes the top five myths of pinkwashing, sparking a volley of critical responses from four prominent pinkwashing opponents.  
But the critics miss the mark, misrepresenting Slepian's arguments, attacking easy straw man versions instead.  And some continue to show a blatant disregard for the facts, making leaps of illogic that would astound the trapeze artists at Cirque du Soleil.  
______________________________________________

A few examples of how Slepian's critics get it wrong:  
1.   Pinkwashing as the new straw man of the BDS movement.  Columbia University professor Katherine Franke declares that not only the Israeli government and American LGBT and Jewish groups, but the Obama administration too is guilty of pinkwashing.  How so?  Because it supposedly uses its “good gay rights record” to deflect attention from its other “objectionable policies… like using drones to execute civilians.”  This only seems to confirm Slepian’s observation that anti-pinkwashers are reminiscent of those who once saw “communists” under every bed.  They see pinkwashing everywhere, even where it isn’t.
2.    Israeli gay rights can’t be separated from Palestinian human rights?  Slepian never suggests, as his critics suppose, there weren’t some connections between the African-American civil rights movement and opposition to the Vietnam war.   Saying the two can be separated isn't the same as saying that they have no relationship at all.  The disproportionate fatality rate among black soldiers in Vietnam, rectified only in the later phases of the war, reflected discrimination against African-Americans versus whites in the draft and in combat roles.  

Slepian did maintain that we were right to celebrate civil rights advances pushed forward by the Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon administrations, even as these same administrations were prosecuting a war in Indochina that many considered wrong (if not immoral).  By the same token, we should celebrate gay rights advances in Israel even though its government is maintaining what many view as an immoral occupation, and committing human rights abuses against Palestinians.  Boycotting civil rights programs supported by the US government over Vietnam would have been a mistake, much it is equally objectionable to boycott gay rights programs supported by the Israeli government because of the occupation.
3.  The Israeli government doesn't fund visits to the US of Israeli speakers or artists who oppose the occupation and its mistreatment of Palestinians?  Then there’s Wendy Elisheva Somerson’s claim that it’s “unlikely that any of the [Israeli Jewish LGBT activists visiting the US] would speak out against the Occupation on a tour being financed by the Israeli government,” despite much evidence to the contrary.
A case in point:  In late June, anti-pinkwashing protesters disrupted the introduction to a San Francisco screening of Israeli filmmaker Yariv Mozer’s documentary “The Invisible Men,” which cast a critical light on harsh Israeli government policies towards gay Palestinian men seeking asylum in Israel.                                                                                                                                                    “When [Mozer] tried to say something counter to the protest, someone in the audience spoke up and said, ‘That wasn’t aimed at you.’ He very forcefully replied ‘Yes it was. My film was partially funded by the Israeli government, my visit here was funded by the Israeli government. I am a leftist and I oppose many of the policies of my government, but I am proud to be an Israeli, and calls for boycott are wrong.’”

Somerson assures us that “Anti-pinkwashing activists [just] want to include the voices of queer Jewish Israelis and Palestinians critical of the Occupation.”    Why then don’t they, together with the Jewish and Palestinian groups they support, help sponsor more events that highlight the lives and struggles of LGBT Palestinians, instead of working to boycott and shut down programs with visiting Israeli Jewish LGBT activists?    Why not build instead of tearing down?  


4.  Truth, and going too far.   Still, neither side in this debate has a monopoly on truth.   Anti-pinkwashing advocates do have important things to say about the suffering of West Bank Palestinians living under Israeli rule.  They offer reasonable and valid critiques of real, as opposed to imagined, misuses of Israel’s gay rights record and the demonization of Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims by the Israeli and American Jewish right. 
But all too often they foul their case by painting with far too broad a brush, smearing everything in their path, doling out guilt by association.  Some of the key players who were involved in the cancellation of Israeli LGBT events in Seattle, and now participants in the Tikkun debate, are lead endorsers of the “Open Letter to LGBTIQ Communities and Allies on the Israeli Occupation of Palestine,” a manifesto for anti-pinkwashing activism released earlier this year.
Their appeals are burdened by extremist rhetoric, like calls for queer solidarity with the most radical, anti-peace factions of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and the occupied territories.  These groups agitate for realizing refugee demands to return to Israel, and do not represent moderate Palestinian voices in the West Bank. 
American queer Palestine solidarity advocates defend BDS tactics that are at best symbolic and ineffectual, and at worst counterproductive, likely to drive a fearful Israeli public further to the right.  
They embrace a Palestinian radicalism that confuses “full self-determination for Palestinians” with boycott, divestment and sanctions against Israel, an end to all US security aid to Israel now, and fulfillment of the “right of return” for Palestinian refugees.  (See the “Open Letter” which links to The Palestinian Civil Society Call for BDS - note especially the last three paragraphs.)  These are reckless steps which would undermine the only viable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – two states for two peoples – and turn Israelis away from taking risks for the difficult compromises which will have to be made for any chance at peace.  
Much as progressive Jewish groups like J Street, Americans for Peace Now and the New Israel Fund work to promote justice and peace for Israelis and Palestinians, while opposing calls to boycott, divest from or sanction Israel and those who do business with it, I believe that we can work for equality for Palestinians, Bedouin and Jews in Israel, for a just Israeli-Palestinian peace and an end to Israel’s occupation while resisting efforts to quash public dialogue with Israeli Jewish LGBT leaders visiting the US
Global BDS “tends to penalize collectively academics, artists and others who actually oppose the occupation, while leaving untouched those responsible for Israel’s most destructive decisions,” as the New Israel Fund so eloquently showed in A Leftist’s Critique of BDS.   Now add to that list the many Israeli Jewish LGBT heroes who are fighting for equal rights for gay Israelis and Palestinians.  
Anti-pinkwashers insist that they aren’t trying to silence Israeli Jewish LGBT leaders visiting the US or their American supporters.  They say they’re merely trying to broaden the conversation.   
But their actions are hard to distinguish from censorship, and the one-dimensional caricatures of Israel by many “Palestine solidarity” people, both straight and gay, are deeply troubling.   That’s why I can’t support so much of what the anti-pinkwashing Global BDS Movement says and does.    There are decent and effective ways to combat occupation and injustice.   This isn’t one of them.

I'm proud to stand with A Wider Bridge and its allies in the LGBT community in Israel in their struggle for equality and inclusion for LGBT Israelis. 

Tuesday, February 28, 2012

Obama National Security Official: Drumbeat for war with Iran harms both Israel and the US, by Doni Remba

Antony Blinken, National Security Advisor to Vice President Biden, said last night in New York that the “drumbeat for war with Iran in the media is incredibly counterproductive” and “plays into the hands of Iran.”   It helps to further drive up the price of oil, undermining US economic recovery, and puts more dollars in Iran’s hands, explained Blinken.   The best policy is to “speak softly and carry a big stick, to be wise and strong.”

He spoke to group of about 100 people at the Harvard Club of New York, at an event sponsored by the Israel Policy Forum.

Blinken stated that the administration believes that Iran has not made a decision to build a nuclear bomb, and stressed that the US and Israel are closely collaborating on assessing Iran’s actions and intentions.   He implied that this assessment was shared by the Israeli government, but neglected to mention recent press reports which indicate that Israeli intelligence too has concluded that Iran has not yet decided whether to make a nuclear bomb.   According to these reports, this was the conclusion that Israeli officials presented to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff US General Martin Dempsey on his recent visit to Israel, a conclusion also reached by US intelligence agencies.  

The Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz reported last month that “The intelligence assessment Israeli officials will present later this week to Dempsey indicates that Iran has not yet decided whether to make a nuclear bomb.  The Israeli view is that while Iran continues to improve its nuclear capabilities, it has not yet decided whether to translate these capabilities into a nuclear weapon - or, more specifically, a nuclear warhead mounted atop a missile. Nor is it clear when Iran might make such a decision.”  ("Barak: Israel 'very far off' from decision on Iran attack," Ha'aretz, Jan. 18, 2012)

When asked if US assessments on Iranian progress towards a nuclear weapon proved wrong, Blinken reaffirmed that “Israel has to make its own decisions” and that “we don’t tell our allies or partners what to do with regard to their own security.”   But he stressed the unprecedented close US-Israeli partnership on safeguarding Israel’s security and on the threat of an Iranian nuclear weapon.   He expressed confidence that “no predecessor has done more than the Obama administration has” to insure Israel’s security.

Blinken believes that the sanctions enacted by the Obama administration are placing heavy pressure on Iran over its nuclear program, and that there is still time for escalated sanctions, combined with diplomatic talks, to avert the threat of an Iranian nuclear weapon.   Iran is “struggling to buy refined petroleum,” and many major corporations in Europe, and foreign subsidiaries of US companies, now refuse to do business with Iran.

“The regime is feeling pressure.”   For those who still doubted this, Blinken cited a remark by President Ahmadinejad that “the West has imposed the most extensive and dastardly sanctions on Iran.  This is the heaviest economic onslaught on a nation in history.”   To illustrate how great the pressure is on the Iranian government, Blinken noted that the Iranian leadership is concerned about the possibility of losing public support for the regime.

While he acknowledged that “any country abiding by the nuclear nonproliferation treaty is entitled to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes, Iran has lost the trust of the entire international community, and it has a long way to go to win back that trust,” if it wishes to do so.  For any diplomacy to have a chance of success after sanctions take an increasing economic toll on Iran, its leaders would have to show real seriousness, backed up by action, in any future talks to convince the US and other countries:   Iran would have to come “to the table in a serious way and show the world that their nuclear program is for peaceful purposes only.”

When asked about the upcoming March 5 Obama-Netanyahu meeting in Washington, and expectations that the US and Israel would formulate an agreement on “what to do about Iran,” Blinken would not speculate, but affirmed the close US-Israeli collaboration, adding that “we may have some disagreements on tactics, but not on fundamental issues of Israel’s security.”   The US and Israel consult closely not just on Iran, but on the Arab Spring, the peace process, Syria and Egypt.

The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process:  When asked whether the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is moribund, Blinken drew upon the well-worn mantra of previous administrations that “we can’t want peace more than Israel does.”  “They have to want it and work for it. That’s where the decision lies,” he said.

But, he continued, “you have to have a partner for peace,” and the Fatah-Hamas reconciliation, he stressed, is an obstacle.   "The Palestinians have to convince Israel that they accept it. They have to decide what their position on Israel is. The international community is united on the need for Hamas to renounce violence, affirm past agreements signed by the Palestinian Authority, and recognize Israel.”   Part of the reason for the fissure in Hamas is over these conditions, he explained, and while “some in Hamas know what they have to do and are considering it, they are not yet the dominant group.”

At the same time, Blinken stressed that the quest for Israeli-Palestinian peace is close to President Obama’s heart, as he believes that creating a lasting peace will strengthen Israel’s security.  Blinken cited President Clinton who used to say that the US will do anything to help those who take risks for peace, and promised that the US will support “those who take risks for peace.”   The role of the US, he explained, is to minimize those risks.    But he was “skeptical that we can make progress this year because of politics in Israel and the US during an election year.”

He ruled out military intervention against Syria to accelerate the toppling of Bashar Assad, saying it “would not solve anything.”  He expressed confidence that Assad will go; the only question is how much damage he will do until that happens, as Assad is murdering his own people at a rate of 50, 60, 70 a day.   He believes that sanctions and isolation are having an effect, and alluded to the flow of business leaders moving out of the country with their families.

The November election, the Republicans and the Jewish vote:   Blinken felt that there was a “decent” chance that Obama and Biden would be re-elected in November for a second term.   When asked why the Republicans feel that they can pick off some of the Jewish vote in the upcoming election, Blinken responded that there has been a lack of factual basis in discussions about US policy on Israel.   Part of the reason, he acknowledged, is that the administration has “had some failure to communicate” as effectively as it should have, but there’s also “a noise machine that drowns out the facts.   Everyone is entitled to their own opinions, but not to their own facts.”   Clearly referring to the frequent Republican misrepresentations of the Obama administration’s policies towards Israel,  Blinken warned against allowing US-Israel relations to be exploited for partisan political purposes, suggesting that turning Israel into a political football during the election campaign could hurt those relations.  

When asked about Obama’s remarks about Israel and the 1967 borders, Blinken cited this as a classic example of the “partisan noise” on Israel, reiterating that Obama had restated long-held US and Israeli policy that in a final peace agreement Israel would return to the 1967 borders with mutually agreeable land swaps.   President George W. Bush too had taken the same position, as he did in a statement at the King David Hotel in Jerusalem in 2008 when he said that any peace agreement requires return to the 1949 armistice lines with mutually agreed land swaps, to take into account demographic changes and to insure that a Palestinian state will be territorially viable.

Blinken said that the pursuit of Israeli-Arab peace has been a priority of the Obama administration, and that the Obama administration supports a two-state solution between Israel as a Jewish state, the homeland of the Jewish people, and a Palestinian state as the homeland of the Palestinian people.    As for the “right of return” of Palestinian refugees, Blinken emphasized that President Obama has been clear about the two-state solution, and that Israel as a Jewish state means that Palestinians will return to a Palestinian state, not to Israel.

Ha'aretz covered the event as well in a lead story on its English online edition, emphasizing several additional key points:   

Chemi Shalev, "US policy on Iran aimed at 'buying time' with Iran, says senior official," Ha'aretz, Feb. 28, 2012

Sunday, September 4, 2011

The story behind my letter in the NY Times on Israel, the Palestinians and the UN

First my letter and a contrary view from the head of the American Jewish Committee (which blames the Palestinians for the failure of peace talks with Netanyahu), both of which appeared side-by-side in the Times, then the back story.

Questions About a Palestinian State, August 12, 2011

To the Editor:
Re “Palestinians and the U.N.” (editorial, Aug. 8):

Historically, Israeli-Arab political breakthroughs have come about only after violent upheavals have changed the political dynamic in Israel, bringing to power more moderate Israeli governments.

The 1973 Yom Kippur war unleashed a political earthquake, enabling a new government to accept the same deal with Egypt that its predecessor had rejected, giving birth to the first Israeli-Arab peace treaty. The first Palestinian intifada ushered in new leadership in 1992 under Yitzhak Rabin, paving the way the following year for Palestinian self-government under the Oslo Accords and peace with Jordan in 1994.

Now Palestinian leaders are calling for unprecedented mass nonviolent marches in the West Bank on the eve of a United Nations vote in September for recognition of Palestinian statehood.

This kind of popular resistance by Palestinians, together with Israel’s revolutionary social justice movement, may ultimately be the tipping point for the creation of a new Israeli coalition that will welcome accelerated United States-led negotiations for a two-state solution.

GIDON D. REMBA
Westfield, N.J., Aug. 8, 2011

The writer, executive director of the Jewish Alliance for Change, served as senior foreign press editor and translator in the Israeli prime minister’s office during the Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations from 1977 to 1978.

To the Editor:

One person stands in the way of Palestinian statehood, and that’s Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian president. He decided last September to abandon all peace negotiations with Israel.

With that move, Mr. Abbas walked away from the United States, after President Obama had played host to the restarting of direct talks, resumed after Mr. Abbas had previously suspended them in January 2009. He walked away from Israel, even though a permanent, sustainable peace accord cannot be attained without Israel and the Palestinians agreeing. And in May he joined in a union with Hamas, the terrorist organization that rejects any peace.

Four successive Israeli governments, and two American presidents, have been committed to working with the Palestinians to achieve a negotiated two-state solution. Mr. Abbas has consistently spurned them. Perhaps he does not want to be the Palestinian leader to tell his people that the conflict is over and that there will be no “right of return.”

Now, pursuing United Nations recognition of a state that doesn’t yet exist, Mr. Abbas has made himself the chief obstacle.

ROBERT ELMAN
President
American Jewish Committee
New York Aug. 8, 2011

To the Editor:

You say “the United States will undoubtedly veto any resolution and that will further isolate both Israel and Washington.” I agree with that, but question if that isolating veto is unavoidable. Would it not be better to inform both parties now that we will abstain and thereby motivate both parties to start serious negotiations immediately?

BÉLA LIPTÁK
Stamford, Conn., Aug. 10, 2011

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/13/opinion/questions-about-a-palestinian-state.html

The back story to my letter:

On Sept. 20, the Palestinians will ask the U.N. General Assembly to be recognized as a state, with borders, reports suggest, to be negotiated with Israel based on the 1967 lines with land swaps - the guidelines proposed by President Obama, and accepted by Israeli prime ministers Ehud Barak and Ehud Olmert, and US presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush.

From the outset of the UN debate, through the day of the vote in early October and beyond, mass nonviolent demonstrations for Palestinian independence are expected to unfold in the West Bank.

Polls of Palestinian attitudes show that a solid two-thirds majority of Palestinians support a two-state peace with Israel based on Obama's parameters, with a complete end to the conflict and end to all claims, testifying that Israeli and American Jewish fears that most Palestinians seek Israel's destruction are unfounded.

Even though the polls also show that most Palestinians are opposed to violence, and prefer a diplomatic solution with Israel, many observers fear that events on the ground will spiral out of control, leading nonviolent demonstrations to become a violent third intifada.

A new Knesset report by Israeli defense and security experts, led by former Defense Minister and IDF Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz, has concluded that "had Israel offered 'a political option' that would have enabled the U.S. administration to draft an agreed formula for resuming Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, it might have been possible to" prevent the Palestinian move, and all the terrible consequences for Israel that are likely to follow.
"The report concluded that what happens in September will create a risk of regional escalation and deterioration. Even though the current Palestinian leadership is not interested in another armed conflict like the second intifada, it said, the impact of the atmosphere generated by the 'Arab Spring,' combined with frustration among the Palestinian public at the gap between the UN's declaration and the reality on the ground, could result in an outbreak of frustration that could end in serious violence."
Former Israeli ambassador to the U.N. Prof. Gabriella Shalev has told the Israeli newspaper Ma'ariv that that after the U.N. vote, when Israel will be viewed throughout the world as occupying the state of Palestine, it will be treated "like South Africa during apartheid." Israel, she warns, "will be swept by a political tsunami the likes of which has never been seen, and will end up a pariah state, subject to sanctions as well as severe boycotts."

1.  What does all this show?  Will it have to get much worse before it gets better?  

From the historical evidence laid out below, it is hard to avoid the conclusion - terrible and tragic though it may be - that Israel has only made peace with its Arab neighbors after violent conflicts have compelled it to accept what more hardline Israeli governments had refused before. This was the case with Golda's government from 1971 to 1973, and the government led four years later by Menacham Begin, Moshe Dayan and Ezer Weizman (which I served as their senior foreign press translator and editor).   The Begin-Dayan-Weizman coalition made peace with Egypt on much the same terms that Sadat had proposed to Israel, through Kissinger, in February 1973 before the October 1973 war.   And it was again the case when Rabin's government reached an interim peace agreement and mutual recognition with the PLO after more than five years of the first initifada, and after more hardline Israeli coalitions refused to recognize or negotiate Palestinian self-government in the West Bank and Gaza with the PLO.

The question poses itself: what will it take for an Israeli government to negotiate a secure two-state solution with moderate Palestinians who oppose violence and accept Israel's right to exist side by side with a demilitarized Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza?  What will it take for an Israeli government to accept what the Netanyahu government has so far refused?

To my great regret, it is beginning to look like it will take dramatically increased steps towards the political and economic isolation of Israel, including sanctions by various countries, following the acceptance of Palestine as an observer non-member state at the UN. And it may well take a third Palestinian intifada - which I can only hope will remain nonviolent, though the odds are not good even if the Palestinian leadership, and the overwhelming majority of the Palestinian public, wishes to keep it so. The reason for this is in large part because Israel "does not do Gandhi very well," as Director of Policy and Political-Military Affairs at the Israel Ministry of Defense Maj-Gen. (res.) Amos Gilad has admitted.   A just-released Wikileaks cable, "confirms that the Israeli army has, in recent months, decided to increase violent pressure on the demonstrations [in the Palestinian West Bank village of Nabi Saleh] ‘even  [if the] demonstrations appear peaceful.’"

As a progressive Zionist and one who has loved and supported Israel all my life, political and economic isolation and a violent new intifada are the last things I would ever wish on it.  But these are the things that Netanyahu, Lieberman and their intransigent, short-sighted friends appear to be bringing down on Israel's head, just as Golda Meir and Yitzhak Shamir did before them.  We can only take some small comfort in the prospect that there is a silver lining in this dark cloud; that after each of the previous episodes of protracted violence, Israel and its Arab neighbors lurched forward to achieve breakthroughs towards peace. May it happen again, sooner rather than later, and if possible, with a minimum of harm to Israel and its people.

The historical evidence: 

2. How Israel squandered the chance for peace with Sadat from 1971 to 1973 before the tragedy of the Yom Kippur War, and the Yom Kippur War led to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. The October 1973 war was a terrible conflict which, we now know, Israel could have avoided by negotiating in good faith on the basis either of Sadat's proposal for a peace agreement, or the partial agreement Sadat, and Moshe Dayan, had proposed, but which Golda Meir stubbornly, and unwisely, rejected.

By now, this view is considered well-established by Israeli historians and journalists.   Here is one example:
Last Chance to Avoid War: Sadat's Peace Initiative of February 1973 and Its Failure Uri Bar-Joseph, International Relations, Haifa University, Journal of Contemporary History, July 2006, http://jch.sagepub.com/content/41/3/545.abstract
Abstract
Most studies of the attempts to reach a political solution to the Egyptian–Israeli dispute between the wars of 1967 and 1973 focus predominantly on the Jarring mission (1968–71), the Rogers plan (1969–70) and Sadat's plan for a partial agreement in the Canal sector (early 1971). However, as this article shows on the basis of new archival documents, the most important diplomatic initiative during this period was Sadat's proposal for a comprehensive settlement of the Egyptian–Israeli dispute, which was secretly submitted to Kissinger in February 1973. Despite the fact that it met most of Israel's requirements regarding peace, Sadat's proposal was rejected by Golda Meir, who refused to return the territories occupied in 1967. Meir's stand did not change even when, in April 1973, Israel's leadership concluded that the only alternative to the diplomatic process was war — which would break out soon. By making this decision, Golda Meir and her colleagues opted for war rather than peace and turned the October 1973 Yom Kippur War into ‘a war of choice’.
Facts like these must cause any thinking Zionist or pro-Israel supporter to radically re-assess (and jettison) the standard trope that Israel is the eternal victim of Arab enmity and has always done its utmost to strive for peace.

3. How the first Palestinian intifada led - both chronologically and causally - to the Oslo Accords and peace with Jordan.  The Oslo Accords represented the first time the Palestinian leadership formally recognized Israel, and Israel recognized the PLO and entered into peace negotiations with it.   This in turn led to the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty in 1994, and a wide opening for Israel of breakthrough diplomatic relations and new trade relations with many countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Arab world, especially the Gulf states.
   
For those who have forgotten, Arafat's letter to Rabin from Sept. 9, 1993, affirmed that 
"The PLO recognizes the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security."  Moreover, the letter stated that with the signing of the Declaration of Principles [the Oslo Accord], and Palestinian acceptance of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, "the PLO affirms that those articles of the Palestinian Covenant which deny Israel's right to exist, and the provisions of the Covenant which are inconsistent with the commitments of this letter, are now inoperative and no longer valid."
Whatever Arafat's personal intentions were, Arafat is dead, the recognition by the PLO of Israel lives on, and strong security cooperation between Israeli and PA security forces on the West Bank - a product of the Oslo Accords - have proven highly effective at combatting terrorism over the last few years, as every senior-ranking Israeli security official publicly attests.   And the leaders who have succeeded Arafat, and those who will succeed Abbas - men like the currently jailed Marwan Barghouti - and the great majority of the Palestinian population, continue to favor peace with Israel.  


The first intifada took place from 1987-1993, an uprising against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza whose goal was Palestinian independence in those territories. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Intifada   

Rabin was elected in 1992 and signed the Oslo Accords in 1993, granting the Palestinians self-government and control over parts of the West Bank and Gaza.  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yitzhak_Rabin   
Rabin won the election in 1992 after promising that he would "undertake to reach an agreement with the Palestinians in the [occupied] territories [i.e., the West Bank and Gaza] within six to nine months of taking office."  http://cliojournal.wikispaces.com/file/view/Walker_Origins+of+Oslo.pdf
Rabin campaigned on a platform of peace with the Palestinians in 1992, and won, but only after Israel had endured 5 years of the Palestinian intifada from 1987 until the uprising formally ended with the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Intifada:  

Outcomes of the first intifada: "The failure of [Israel's] 'Iron Fist' policy, Israel's deteriorating international image and Jordan cutting legal and administrative ties to the West Bank and the U.S.'s recognition of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people forced Rabin to seek an end the violence though negotiation and dialogue with the PLO."[42][43]

Had Israel sought to negotiate a viable and just two-state solution with the Palestinians before the intifada broke out, explored mutual recognition and a cessation of terrorism with the PLO during the 1980's - the PLO in fact first formally accepted UN Resolutions 242 and 338 in 1988, recognizing Israel's right to exist in secure and recognized borders, leading the Reagan administration to enter into dialogue with it; had Israel stopped the exponential growth in settlements and encroachment on private Palestinian land and Palestinian population centers in the West Bank and Gaza, both the first and second Palestinian intifadas could very probably have been avoided, saving many lives, on both sides.


As we reach the eve of what may be the third intifada, coupled with an unprecedented wave of international political and economic isolation and opprobrium for Israel, it appears that Israeli leaders are about to repeat the same follies - with the same outcome.

The views expressed here, and in my New York Times letter, are solely my own and not those of any organization I am affiliated with.  

Thursday, July 14, 2011

Breaking: New Obama Peace Initiative: American-Islamic summit to affirm 1967 borders in exchange for recognition of Israel as Jewish State – Egyptian News Report

Yonatan Gonen, Nana10 (Israel – Hebrew) 7/14/11
An Egyptian newspaper reports that the Obama administration has proposed to Arab states, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, to hold a joint American-Islamic summit.  The purpose: to promote an international agreement on the Palestinian issue, in exchange for recognition of the Jewishness of Israel
An Egyptian newspaper reports this morning (Thursday) that Arab countries are currently consulting with each other on a new American initiative regarding the peace process and a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict based on the return of territories in exchange for recognition of Israel as a Jewish state. 
According to the report in the Egyptian newspaper “Al Masry Al Youm” the intent is to establish a Palestinian state in the 1967 borders, with comprehensive Arab recognition of the Jewishness of the State of Israel in exchange.   According to the report, the consultations are taking place at high levels between the United States and the Arab states.
The report continues that the Obama administration proposed to various countries, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, to hold a joint American-Islamic summit.   The objective would be to promote an international agreement on the Palestinian issue in exchange for Arab recognition of the Jewishness of Israel.
The Arab states have not yet responded to the US proposal and are currently consulting with each other.  The US initiative will be discussed at the Arab Peace Initiative Committee this Saturday, which will take place in Cairo under the sponsorship of the Arab League. 
Translation by Doni Remba - Hat tip: Col. (res) Shaul Arieli

Comment:  The formulation of any US-initiated international understanding will surely refer to the 1967 borders with mutually agreed land swaps, "so that secure and recognized borders are established for both states," as stated in Obama's May 19, 2011 speech.   According to news reports in the Israeli press, Netanyahu has accepted this formula as well - the Obama borders parameters in exchange for Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state at the end end of the negotiating process.   Obama is hoping to give him even more than he asked for:  comprehensive Arab and Islamic recognition of the Jewishness of Israel.

It's worth mentioning that I predicted two years ago that Obama would eventually do something like this in a Viewpoint column I published in the Jerusalem Report under the title,  "Obama's Grand Plan for the Middle East," (PDF version of the published piece; or go here for the web version published in Jewcy) (June 8, 2009)

Wednesday, June 29, 2011

Former Israeli Defense Minister Amir Peretz on Israel’s Peace and Security Challenges, by Doni Remba

Amir Peretz, now a Labor Knesset Member who serves on the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense and Economic Affairs Committees, and a front-runner for the leadership of the Labor Party, is visiting New York to share his current take on Israel’s political and security dilemmas.  He appeared yesterday before a small group during a luncheon at the Harvard Club, sponsored by the Israel Policy Forum and MTP Investment Group. (I first visited with Peretz as part of an Americans for Peace Now delegation at Israel's Defense Ministry in June 2006, when he served as Defense Minister in the Olmert Government, a position he held during 2006 – 2007; photo above).

Israeli-Palestinian Peace Talks

Peretz believes that Israel must push the peace process forward, because time is not on Israel's side. Israeli Jews will soon become a minority between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean, and the window of opportunity for negotiations will close, leaving Israel with far worse options than a negotiated two-state agreement. After a September vote for unilateral Palestinian statehood at the United Nations, Israel’s strategic position may be dramatically weaker.

I would add that even Netanyahu’s most ardent American Jewish supporter, Ron Lauder, has now issued much the same charge against him as Peretz:  “Top Jewish leader and close Netanyahu ally blasts PM for lack of a diplomatic plan,” Ha’aretz, June 29, 2011.  Lauder’s strong criticisms of Netanyahu are all the more remarkable given that he has not only long been a close ally of Netanyahu’s, but a conservative on Israel and a sharp critic of Obama’s positions on Israel from the right.   Lauder now reportedly believes that “Israel must present a diplomatic plan in order to regain international support and block Palestinian efforts to obtain unilateral recognition for statehood from the UN in September… Lauder also criticized the conditions Netanyahu has set for talks, saying the only way Israel can escape its international isolation is to agree to begin negotiations without preconditions.”

Under Netanyahu, Israel is in a stalemate with the Palestinians, and losing valuable time, says Peretz. Netanyahu insists on two pre-conditions for negotiations with the Palestinians: first, that the Palestinians recognize Israel as a Jewish state. Peretz says he asked Netanyahu why he needs this, when Begin signed a peace treaty with Egypt, and Rabin with Jordan, without ever making such a demand.  "We do not need anyone else to tell us who or what we are in Israel," protests Peretz. "We define that. The whole world knows that we define Israel as a Jewish state."

Second, Netanyahu insists that Abbas cancel his agreement to form a unity government with Hamas. Peretz objects to this, and has asked Netanyahu: if you sign a peace treaty with the Prime Minister of Lebanon, will you demand first that he throw out the Hezbollah ministers from his government? Let the Lebanese Prime Minister deal with the consequences of having his government approve a peace deal with Israel. If the government is willing, either Hezbollah will be forced to acquiesce and remain in government if it wants to retain its political influence, or it will protest by leaving the government on its own accord. Much the same applies to Hamas, whose leaders have repeatedly said that if Abbas reaches a peace accord with Israel, and the agreement is acceptable to a majority of Palestinians, it will not stand in the way and will accept it. So why not see if we can negotiate a peace deal with Abbas, suggests Peretz, and if we do indeed reach agreement, let Hamas be placed in the position of having to deal with remaining party to a national unity government that endorses a peace treaty with Israel?   Or it can quit the government and go into opposition if it wishes.

Those who say that they want to release Gilad Shalit, but refuse to release Palestinian prisoners who have “blood on their hands,” are not facing reality, says Peretz.  "If you want Shalit back, you have to pay the price.  Much the same applies with Israeli-Palestinian peace.  If you want a peace agreement, you have to pay the price – and the price is well known."   Peretz notes that he told jailed Fatah-Tanzim leader Marwan Barghouti that he thought they needed three years to reach a final agreement. Barghouti objected, "we can do it in three hours," as we already know the contours of any possible deal.  The Palestinians, says Peretz, will need to accept that somewhere between four and six percent of the West Bank, representing settlement blocs, will remain part of Israel, with land swaps from Israeli territory in exchange.  The Palestinians also need a road between the West Bank and Gaza. The land necessary to construct such a road might play a part in a land swap agreement that allows for some settlements to remain under Israeli control.

Peretz has said to Netanyahu that instead of demanding unrealistic pre-conditions for peace talks with Abbas, he should simply admit that he believes the peace process is a danger for Israel, and that he is unwilling to pay the necessary price to achieve an agreement with the Palestinians. Peretz’s point seems to be that this is Netanyahu’s real position, and the preconditions are simply meant as a way to avoid talks by insisting on demands which the Palestinians cannot realistically meet before a negotiating process has even begun. Peretz thinks Obama’s parameters for resuming peace talks – on the basis of the 1967 lines with negotiated land swaps -- are not bad for Israel. These terms of reference reflect the reality of all previous peace efforts over the last decade under Barak and Clinton, Olmert, Abbas and Bush.

Negotiations and the September UN Palestinian Statehood Resolution

Does Peretz agree with the recent proposal by his colleague, Israel Labor Party international secretary Colette Avital (together with former Mossad official Yossi Alpher, Major-General Mordechai Gazit and Mark Heller, a researcher for the Institute for National Security Studies), that the US and EU put their weight behind devising a “win-win” UN Security Council resolution for Palestinian statehood that would be acceptable to most Israelis and Palestinians? These authors believe that it is a “waste of time and energy to try to revive a moribund peace process.” (“Buying Into Palestinian Statehood,” New York Times, June 24, 2011)

Peretz respectfully disagrees. He prefers to stop the Palestinian UN gambit entirely, which he believes is a “dangerous game,” by resuming negotiations directly with the Palestinians. Peretz may have in mind here what others have pointed out:  following the passage of such a resolution, if nothing changes on the ground, Palestinian popular frustration is likely to mount, leading to a potential new escalation in the conflict, with ramifications for peace prospects that may not be favorable. For example, what if popular Palestinian protests undermine the Palestinian Authority and its leaders, with whom Israel has an opportunity to reach a workable peace arrangement in the near term?  Peretz does not raise these specific points, but they may be what he has in mind when he alludes to the dangers of a UN Security Council resolution, even one that includes a Palestinian commitment to resume negotiations with Israel on the basis of the resolution’s parameters.

The fly in the ointment, however, is who is doing the negotiating for Israel. Peretz is running for re-election now, and my guess is that his position is intended to differentiate what he and his Labor colleagues are offering versus Netanyahu and the Likud. If Peretz, and other security-minded doves (like former IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-General Amnon Lipkin-Shahak and others who endorsed the Geneva Initiative), were doing the negotiating for Israel, chances are they would reach an agreement on borders and security acceptable to majorities on both sides.

But the likelihood of Labor leading the negotiations is slim. For this reason, I believe the Avital-Alpher-Gazit-Heller proposal is meant as a recommendation to American and European leaders for a better course of action in the likely event that Netanyahu continues as prime minister. In that case, their assessment that direct Israeli-Palestinian peace talks are unlikely to bear fruit, is spot on – unless the Obama administration steps up and offers bridging proposals and is willing to apply the kind of diplomatic leverage that has made a decisive difference in past (remember Kissinger’s “re-assessment” and the Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement, President Carter's threats to both Begin and Sadat at Camp David during the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations, George H.W. Bush’s withholding loan guarantees over settlement expansion with Yitzhak Shamir, which led to Rabin’s election and the breakthrough of the Oslo Accords, Israeli-Palestinian mutual recognition and security cooperation, bolstering Israel’s anti-terrorism capacities in the West Bank to this day.)

Obama is unlikely to take such dramatic steps in an election year, so the proposed win-win UN resolution may be meant to provide a more fruitful basis for renewed state-to-state negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians over borders, settlements, land swaps and security arrangements.

Peretz endorses the proposal of Israeli-American businessman David Avital, our host for the luncheon, offered in a recent opinion piece in Politico, entitled “Why Israel Should Welcome Palestine.”   Avital suggests that Obama take the lead in reviving negotiations to reach a borders-first agreement, with Netanyahu’s support. An agreement on borders will bring about a Palestinian state by mutual consent, providing a wealth of benefits to the US, Israel and the Palestinians, as well as to US allies in the Arab world. Avital believes that if Obama takes the initiative, Netanyahu may follow.  Avital has had a close personal relationship with Netanyahu for decades, since their days in Israel’s elite anti-terrorism force, Sayeret Matkal. Despite the great skepticism of just about everyone else these days, he may have a sound basis for believing that under the right conditions, Netanyahu can be brought around (which presumably would require him to refashion his governing coalition by including Kadima and perhaps even Labor). But it is Obama who must set the table.

A recent report in Ma'ariv, one of Israel's most widely read daily newspapers, suggests that Netanyahu has accepted President Obama's principles for renewing negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.  According to the report, he has "agreed in principle to define the borders between Israel and a Palestinian state based on the 1967 lines, including territory swaps.   At the same time, in return for the concession, he demands of the Palestinians two conditions that would be fulfilled only at the end of the negotiations--recognition of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people, and that the refugee issue would be resolved within the framework of the Palestinian state, and not Israel."   (S. Daniel Abraham Center for Middle East Peace, Israel News Update, July 1, 2011).   If the report proves true, it again suggests that Netanyahu will have had to come around to Peretz's position to break Israel's diplomatic deadlock.

At the end of the day, perhaps both Peretz and the win-win UN resolution proponents are right, each in their own arena.   Such a resolution would be unnecessary if Labor and men like Peretz were leading the peace charge. With Netanyahu at the helm, it may be the least bad alternative move for the US.  And it may actually do some good, especially if the US initiates and closely oversees both the negotiations and UN process, and co-opts Israel by fashioning the UN resolution to meet key Israeli requirements.

Palestinian Leaders and Strategy vis-à-vis Israel

Peretz revealed that he meets with Fatah-Tanzim senior leader Marwan Barghouti from time to time in his Israeli jail cell (as do a few other Israeli politicians on the left). Barghouti, he avers, will be the next Palestinian leader after Abbas (Peretz’s visits with Barghouti were reported a few days ago in the Jerusalem Post).  Barghouti has said to him (not reported in the Post, but shared by Peretz in New York): “Forget the idea of a Palestinian return to violence, a violent third intifada.” Barghouti has some credibility on this point, having played a key role in the militarization of the second intifada (he has been called its “mastermind”). “You Israelis love the [second] intifada” – whose hallmark was the advent of an unprecedented campaign of suicide bombings by Palestinian terrorists against Israeli civilians. “Then the whole world says that the Palestinians are all terrorists. We have learned that game.” Barghouti is saying that he and other Palestinians who once supported violent resistance against Israel, including terrorism, have learned that it ultimately works to the disadvantage of the Palestinians, discrediting their national movement and their moral case, as moderate Palestinian peace advocates like Abbas and Sari Nusseibeh insisted all along.

Barghouti has also told Peretz that “We know that the refugees cannot return to Israel. But this Palestinian concession has to be made as part of a final, comprehensive agreement.” It is politically unrealistic to insist on it as a pre-condition for peace talks. For the Palestinians, recognizing Israel as a Jewish state in advance of negotiations is tantamount to telling their own people – before negotiations have even begun – that Palestinian leaders intend to surrender wholesale the refugee “right of return” claimed for so long by Palestinians. Barghouti is saying, it is unwise – it puts us in an impossible position at this stage of the game – to demand this of us now. It can happen as part of the big package, once all the concessions and compromises are made by both sides and the peace dividend is much clearer for both societies to see.

On final borders Peretz says that the Palestinians know that between four to six percent of the West Bank will need to remain part of Israel to enable it to incorporate settlement blocs, for which Israel will need to exchange land from within the Green Line as compensation, and provide a land corridor for safe passage between the West Bank and Gaza. The net outcome, he says, should reflect Obama’s principle of 1967 borders with land swaps. Small settlements in remote areas, and the 100 illegal (under Israeli law) settlement outposts, including many settlements built in whole or in part on privately owned Palestinian land, will have to be evacuated under an agreement.

Peretz believes that Israel withdrew too hastily from Gaza, without adequate planning for resettling the settlers. Now we know what the relocation package needs to be; it can be done better. “We have a responsibility to them,” he stresses.

National Security and Defense

Peretz says that when he was Defense Minister he decided to approve Israel’s Iron Dome anti-missile system essentially on his own, as the Prime Minister (Olmert) and IDF Chief of Staff were opposed. This is not altogether surprising, given that Peretz lives in Sderot, which has for the last few years been the primary target of rocket attacks from Gaza by Palestinian extremists from Hamas and Islamic Jihad. He stresses that even when Israel signs a peace treaty with its Arab and Palestinian neighbors, it will need a strong army and defense network to guarantee the peace.

The Iron Dome system recently destroyed nine missiles heading towards Ashkelon and Beer Sheva. As a result, Hamas asked Israel for a “hudna,” an unwritten truce, because they grasped that the Iron Dome had neutralized their advantage, suggests Peretz.  An Iron Dome battery has now been deployed for Haifa, and more will be placed in the Galilee in due course. He suggests that the system may even deter Hezbollah, impelling it negotiate. This point seems unpersuasive to me given the very large number of missiles in Hezbollah’s possession (estimated at 40,000), and the number of missiles that Hezbollah can now fire during the course of a future war in a single day, is far greater than its capability during the 2006 Lebanon War. Israel lacks anywhere near the number of Iron Dome batteries it would need to deal effectively with Hezbollah rockets and missiles, and will for the foreseeable future.

Peretz described his visits with Field Marshall Mohamed Hussein Tantawi in Egypt when he was defense minister. Tantawi now heads the Higher Military Council that took control of Egypt after President Hosni Mubarak was swept from power. He describes Tantawi as someone who did not like talking to the Israelis, so Omar Suleiman, the head of Egyptian Military Intelligence, was sent to be the interlocutor in his place. Nonetheless, Tantawi is widely regarded as committed to preserving the peace treaty with Israel, and Peretz stresses that Tantawi, like other Egyptian leaders, has strong incentives to keep the peace, and continue the $1.3 billion in military aid that Egypt receives from the US. He does not believe that the Arab Spring will alter the essence of Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel, having prevented war between Israel and its largest, most powerful Arab neighbor for more than 30 years.

Friday, June 24, 2011

Israel and the Polarization of American Jews, by Gidon D. Remba, Jerusalem Report

In “Israel and the Polarization of American Jews,” (The Jerusalem Report, June 20, 2011), I suggest that the controversy over Tony Kushner’s views on Israel highlight the ways in which the gap between liberal and conservative Jews regarding Israel is becoming an unbridgeable chasm. At the same time, I question the value of defining who is “inside the Jewish communal tent” and who is “outside,” as leaders in the organized Jewish community have suggested, on the basis of whether a person or organization “recognizes Israel as a democratic Jewish state.”

Today, many human rights activists and groups which are not avowedly Zionist work closely with pro-Israel groups like ours that are fighting for justice and equality in Israel. Our Campaign for Bedouin-Jewish Justice (a project of Rabbis for Human Rights-North America and the Jewish Alliance for Change), for example, has brought together American Jewish and Israeli Arab groups across the ideological spectrum, including some in Israel and the U.S. who would be defined as “outside the tent” by the conventional definition. Acting in concert has enabled us all to be more effective in our efforts to stop the demolition of homes in unrecognized Negev Bedouin villages and the violent expulsion of Bedouin Israeli men, women and children by the Israeli government.

By working together to advance equal citizenship for both Arab and Jewish Israelis, aren’t non-Zionist human rights activists doing more to secure Israel’s future as a democratic Jewish state than some Zionists who pass the conventional test of “kashrut” for membership in the “communal tent”? The misbegotten controversy in Israel’s Knesset and at the Boston Jewish Community Relations Council over whether J Street is “pro-Israel” enough to be included in Jewish communal institutions is another case in point.

Perhaps the time has come to do away with the impulse to excommunicate Jewish groups engaged in activism for peace, human rights and justice in Israel if they take unorthodox political stands or do not speak in ways that representatives of the mainstream community deem politically correct.

Click here to read “Israel and the Polarization of American Jews.”

A Remembrance of Massad, by Doni Remba

Massad Camps Logo
The excitement rose as we rounded the bend; we opened the windows to get closer to the crisp autumnal mountain air. But only unending forest, punctuated by the occasional stream or cabin, lay within our vista. Our wheels gripped the serpentine asphalt as we pressed anxiously ahead, half believing, half doubting we would reach our Granada. The panorama seemed never to change, as if some nature-mad artist could paint only a wilderness tableau from a palate of splendiferous green. We followed another bend to the right, careening again to the left. Soon we would cross the Delaware River, I imagined, to traverse the rickety Dingman’s Bridge, our mission unfulfilled. Had we gone too far?

Was Massad, alas, dead? There can be no doubt that Machane Massad still lives in the hearts of many who came of age in what can only be described as the most unique melding of Jewish tradition, Hebrew culture and Zionism outside of Eretz Yisrael. There can be no doubt: the soul of Massad remains alive even now. It is passed on every day to our children, our friends, our families, in every moment of ahavat yisrael, every act of mitzvah. Does the body of Massad too remain? This was the question my brother Zev and I sought out to answer for ourselves on a crisp October day.

The Remba roots are planted deeply in the soil of Massad. My father, Oded Remba, z”l, and my mother, Chaya Remba, z"l, were Massad couple number 37, having met in the summer of 1952 at Massad Beth, my mother as Rosh Plugah in the Maccabiah, my father as Sgan Rosh. Chaya rose from a counselor to become head counselor of the girls camp, and eventually director. At the age of six, by 1959, I began as a camper in Shoresh. Only Zev can claim the honor of having been practically born at Massad, summarily shipped in the summer of 1961 almost straight from the delivery room to his own little bunk in Kibbutz HaSharon.

Chaya had a friend with a vacation home in Hemlock Hedges, the community in Dingman’s Ferry; he did not remember there being any camp on Route 209. Had Massad been razed by developers, replaced by more lucrative summer home real estate? We feared the worst. I flew to Washington, DC, where Zevi lives with his wife and daughter, Rebecca, and we set out on the six-hour drive from the Potomac to the Poconos to see for ourselves. Had it yielded to rapacious real estate moguls, we feared we might not even recognize the grounds where the camp had long stood. I insisted that if anything would serve as a guide post, surely Elmer’s would—or Marcel Lake Store, the only general store in Dingman’s Ferry. If we hit Elmer’s, and didn’t find the camp, we had gone too far. We hoped too, that the agam and the dam, which could easily be seen from the road, would serve as a locator. Surely no developer would have spoiled its simple, pristine beauty. Weary now from our long sojourn, lost in a land of lake and pine, our spirits began to flag.

Suddenly a vision unfolded to our right: the two stone pillars from which the name Massad Beth had once been displayed! They remained, but the sign did not. In its place, was a small placard reading Messivta Eitz Haim Bobover Camp; and a chain link fence surrounding the entire side of the camp which faced the road. We pulled in to the broad grassy Migrash Chanaya across the road, to be greeted by a pair of wild deer. As we approached the fence, we noticed that a hole had been cut, through which we could easily pass. Relieved that we would not be scaling the high fence, we moved stealthily, our voices hushed as we passed the caretaker’s house, a skill cultivated on many a nocturnal raid on these very grounds during the sixties under the tutelage of Yisrael Schorr, Effie Buchwald and David Gitler. Our nostrils were immediately overwhelmed by the powerful scent of pine tree—yes, the familiar sweet air of Massad!

We walked down the main pathway and surveyed the horizon: Massad remained! Every building, every feature. We were ready to kiss the ground in ecstasy! Hayeenu kecholmeem . . . we were as dreamers on our return. We turned first to the Chadar Ochel. Our hearts quickly sank. Suddenly we felt a little like Jews returning from Galut to the Temple after its desecration. The Bobover chassidim had apparently abandoned the camp after the summer of 1996, having left it in a state of ungodly balagan. The dining room gave off a noxious odor, which could be traced to the unclean state in which it had been left. Zevi quipped that an order of Dag Moshe Rebbeinu must have been left in the kitchen to ripen. The Bobover had installed central air conditioning units on top of the low roof in the front of the Chadar Ochel. As a result, the roof was sagging, a disaster in the making.

The road from Shderot Hagvurah, the main path, to the Chadar Ochel, had been festooned with festive naked light bulbs suspended from a string, as if every day was a carnival. Colorful stenciled signs were hung on trees, with such epigrams as “tsaddik katamar yifrach.” Saddest of all, we found two of the multi-colored Chagall-inspired faux stained-glass panels depicting the tribes of Israel which had long adorned the windows of the dining room; one lay intact on the floor; the other outside on the grass, shattered.

As we walked onto the hill descending from the Chadar Ochel to Ulam Hamachon, what struck me immediately was that the agam was no longer visible, the trees and foliage having grown to obstruct the view. One could not survey the Chadar Ochel without finding oneself amidst a rush of memories: the daily excitement of scanning the “tafreet” to discover the specialite du jour, the festive Shabbat dinners and zemirot, the countless zimriot and “shidurei radio,” Louie Bernstein’s mystical, magical tales of the Ba’al Shem Tov in the hushed twilight of Shabbat afternoon. And now the Ba’al Shem’s spiritual heirs had inherited this very space. It was on the grassy lawn of Ulam Hamachon that Louie had, one Shabbat, once posed the question to several dozen campers: what makes Judaism different from other religions? An awkward silence engulfed the group. I raised my hand, and ventured: It’s an entire way of life. Exactly, Louie beamed. A way of life. Halacha.

The most radical change which the Bobover had made to the camp now loomed ahead. Where once had been the pastoral expanse of Meegrash Hatzanhanim, was now the largest edifice in the camp: a massive grey, stone-block two-story building. The first floor remained unfinished, a construction site left in disarray, cement bags and wheel-barrows left in midstream. We bounded up a flight of outside stairs to the second, and main, floor of the building, entering through a pair of doors. We found ourselves inside a cavernous room, clearly a shul. The Aron Kodesh, emptied of its Sifrei Torah, was built in the front, its curtains drawn. In the rear, floor-to-ceiling book cases spanned the entire length of the structure, still populated with hundreds of sifrei kodesh: Talmud Bavli, Pirke Avot, Mishne Torah LaRambam, the Shulchan Aruch, and numerous other commentaries. Dozens of white and black kitels and umbrellas were oddly suspended from racks behind the bookcases. Outside we found large Carrier central air conditioning units which had already been installed. We had thrived at Massad for decades without air conditioning; we wondered why the Bobover so needed it.

We left the shul and walked a short way to the fork in the road, to the intersection of Rehov Haneviim (the Path of the Prophets) and Rehov Ahad Ha’am, the prophet of cultural Zionism. Though the trees had turned to their fiery fall hues, smothering the ground in a dense blanket of pine needles and leaves, they still formed the extraordinary graceful wish-bone canopy, enclosing what had once been Massad’s heavenly garden, Gan Moshe Sharett. It was the garden, I reminded Zev, where he had become a Bar Mitzvah in the summer of 1974. I could see the benches filling the grassy knoll between the trees, in an arc around the table on which the Sefer Torah was read. It was the last vision I had of Massad Beth until that very moment: here I was, in that same spot, twenty-three years later. Three days after Zevi’s Bar Mitzvah, I left for Israel, where I lived for the next four years, as a student at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. I was never to see Massad again. Until today. Zevi had returned for another two summers, graduating from Alufim, consummating what for him had been fifteen almost-consecutive summers at Massad. We sat on the flat rocks on the roadside and marvelled at what lay before us.

We took the right fork in the road and proceeded down Rechov Haneviim, past Kikar Mordei Hagettaot (the Plaza of Ghetto Resistance Fighters), towards Beit Betzalel and the Marpeah. All had remained frozen in time. We reached the twin silver migdelei mayeem, where on Erev Shabbat, the boys would kiss the girls goodnight, before sending them on their way to Kibbutz Hasharon. The Migrash Kadoor Basees remained but without its defining foundation: the chain-link fence backstop behind home plate had been removed. Passing the tennis courts, we stopped to visit the first bunk before entering the girls’ camp, Beit Menahel Hamashek, next to the guest houses. We remembered it as the bunk where Chaya had lived for many a summer; I recalled that before she had taken it over, Harry Berman had used it.

From there, we descended Shderat Weizmann into the Sharon and checked out the girls’ bunks. Almost all remained unchanged, with but one exception. The small bunk at the end of the girls’ camp where Zevi had spent his first summers with a metapelet, was no more, having been replaced by a large aluminum-sided trailer, out of which a bunk had been devised. The area around Ulam Nordau had been converted into an outdoor day care center, dozens of haphazardly-strewn tricycles still littering the terrain. We found one of the old green wooden ping pong tables on which we had so often played, especially when our father visited, laying overturned in front of Ulam Nordau. It was here that I remembered the oversized tents in which some had lived during the summers of the 50’s and early 60’s, and the vegetable gardens we had cultivated like kibbutzniks by Beit Betzalel in those pioneering years.

We ascended from the Sharon, passing Meir Moskowitz’s, Noam Shudofsky’s and Louie Bernstein’s bunks, and headed towards Kibbutz Yizrael. I was soon overcome with memories of countless yeridim and tkaseem which filled the broad field in the center of the camp. We reached the boys’ camp and entered Bunk 21, the first in the first row, called Rehov HaRav Kook, where both Zevi and I had been campers in Shoresh. The new tenants had made some changes: the bunks, once white, had now been painted a bright, garish yellow, the wooden green doors replaced with metal, chicken wire now covering wood beams on the porches, presumably a safety measure to prevent small children from crawling through and falling to the ground. Inside, the bunks had been paved with linoleum, rear doors had been added, and the rear cubby area had been eliminated, each camper’s cubby now having been built next to his bed. We had a strong urge to “french” one of the beds, but the lack of toothpaste and shaving cream (as well as sheets) dampened our ardor. Missing were the shlateem of Degania, Nahalal and so many other kibbutzim and moshavim, which had adorned the portals to each bunk, the handiwork of their denizens at Beit Betzalel.

Soon we reached Rehov Bialik and the large bunk where I had spent Prozdor and Zev Alufim. It had been converted inside into an array of smaller rooms, each with refrigerator and bathroom. It was in this bunk where I had met Tzveeka, our counselor from Israel, who had invited us to visit Kibbutz Ramat Yochanan for the following summer. The summer of 1969, my father, mother, Zev and I lived on the kibbutz; 1968 was to be my last year at Massad as a camper. I returned to Massad Aleph five years later, after my freshman year of college, to work in the kitchen, assist with Jewish music on the guitar, and edit the camp newsletter, Massad Echoes. It was there, during my budding years as a philosophy student, that I came to know and befriend Rabbis David Eliach and Meir Havatzelet, with whom I spent long hours in conversation.

From the Prozdor bunk we descended the gravel path down to Meegrash Kennedy, passing the Meegrash Kadoor Af on which we had played; the tetherball poles that had dotted the boys’ camp were no longer in evidence. Meegrash Kennedy remained exactly as we had remembered it, the site of baseball games, Maccabiah track and field contests, and my personal favorite pe’ulat erev: keebush hadegel. What was so remarkable about that game was its pure simplicity: all it took to play was a pick-up truck to shine it’s lights across the midsection of the field, creating a border between the two sides, two small flags, and we felt we were spies fighting some patriot’s game in the midst of the Second World War or Meelchemet Hasheechrur. The entire game was created whole out of the fabric of imagination: passwords and a “Keleh” where prisoners were kept if discovered without the right password on the wrong side of the border. The medurot and tent camping we did on the left side of the field by the agam were unforgettable experiences, charging us with a rustic sense of the outdoors from the earliest age. The lazy reeds still congregated at the edge of the agam, a reminder to turn one’s canoe about.

We continued along the path by the shore of the agam, hoping to stumble on the Indian arrow-heads once so commonplace there. On the lake’s opposite shore, we could detect the signs of vacation homes which had been developed since our last visit more than two decades before. Several docks extended from the water’s edge, mooring for small fishing boats. Indeed, we soon encountered two fisherman astride a wide platform, suspended over twin canoes, gently plying the lake for the day’s catch. Finally we reached the swimming section of the agam: the Massad docks were no more, the lake having been restored to its primal serenity. Only a few poles poked out of the murky water, remnants of a possible floating dock, so Zevi speculated. The shed where water accouterments for the lifeguards and swimmers had been stored was gone—the long bamboo poles, the canoes and row-boats. Here whistles had blown, and the letters of the Hebrew alphabet were chanted out in unison, always by pairs, as in Talmud study, wafting their way to Heaven, weaving their own secret language which only the Lord might divine: aleph, bet, gimel, dalet . . .

We started up the steep gravel path back up to camp; a thick tree, felled by lightening, blocked our way. Someone had attempted to saw it into pieces to remove it, but had abandoned the project midway. Everywhere we trod, Massad had the feel of an unfinished symphony. We quickly ascended the path, and found ourselves behind Ulam Channah Senesh—she who had given her life parachuting behind German lines to aid the Jewish resistance against the Nazis. “Even if they catch me,” she had remarked, “that will become known to the people in the concentration camps. They will know that someone was coming to try to help them.” The young Chana was not only caught, but executed. Yet somehow, she lived on at Massad. Even now, her defiant spirit cried out.

We returned from our reveries: the ascent had always seemed to take so much longer, Zev remarked; we were wet, shivering and wearing thongs, I rejoined. And we had little legs, he opined. I was ready for my “meetz (aka “bug juice”) and Tam-Tams,” but alas we had to settle for a taste of memory. We found rooms on the underside of Senesh which looked as if their inhabitants had fled from Pharoah in haste: cartons of milk, boxes of cereal, languishing on tables. Zevi wondered whether we might still find meeschakeem shkayteem inside the Senesh closet had we succeeded in entering. What, too, had become of the large pen and ink drawing of Camp Muncie which had hung on the Senesh wall? But Senesh was locked; her secrets would remain unplumbed. It was here that I had sung my first solo as a six-year old: Keli ata, ve-odeka . . . We reached Misrad Hachinuch, from which Noam, Meir and Chaya had awakened us: Boker Tov Machane Massad Bet! Hasha’a shesh vachaytsee! Na lakoom meen ha-meetot uleheetlabesh b'meechnasayeem ketzareem! We would scurry out into the crisp morning mountain air for shachareet and breakfast.

Ulam Herzl, the site of many a movie and musical performance—I had played mandolin there, sung in countless makaylot, danced Yesh Lanu Tayeesh on Erev Shabbat—was closed, filled to the brim with cement bags for the Bobover construction site nearby. It was here, as a child, that I first saw the film “Let My People Go,” and began to sense the enormity of the Shoah. It was here, too, that I first saw “A Raisin in the Sun,” and learned the lesson I had discovered so many times again: that all men and women, black and white, Jew and non-Jew, are created by one God, each with the same God-given dignity, b’tselem elokim. And it was here that I first understood that a mouse could roar.

No small irony, this, for a place named after the founder of political Zionism. For these became the articles of faith of my Zionism, as they had been Herzl’s: “Hold fast,” urged Herzl in Old-New Land, “to the things that have made us great: to liberality, tolerance, love of mankind. Only then is Zion truly Zion.” It was Moshe Sharett who may have best voiced its essence: “In this vision will be found the quintessence of our ancient tradition, before the sojourns and dispersion, which always emphasized the universal in our spiritual world and all which is supranational in our road to morality and progress.”

How ironic, too, that we honored with an “ulam” Max Nordau, Herzl’s atheist Zionist colleague, who had suggested the abolition of the Shabbat in the Jewish state, rather than Ahad Ha’am, who celebrated its sacred centrality to Judaism, and whose own spiritual Zionism placed a revival of Jewish tradition and culture at its heart. It was Shabbat, after all, which symbolized the brit between God and man, bearing witness to Judaism’s universal message. In the words of one of the great religious-Zionist Mizrahi sages of mandatory Palestine, the Chief Rabbi of Tel Aviv: “Our history begins not with the Patriarchs but with Adam . . . Our Torah is not content with nationalism alone but has regard for the whole world and general humanity precedes our Patriarchs.” It was Ahad Ha’am who could write, as Nordau never did, of the relationship between Jewish nationalism and Jewish ethics in “The Character of Judaism”:
The Jewish law of justice is not confined within the narrow sphere of individual relations. In its Jewish sense the precept ‘Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself’ can be carried out by a whole nation in its dealings with other nations. For this precept does not oblige a nation to sacrifice its life or its position for the benefit of other nations. It is, on the contrary, the duty of every nation, as of every individual human being, to live and to develop to the utmost limit of its powers; but at the same time it must recognize the right of other nations to fulfill the like duty without let or hindrance. Patriotism—that is, national egoism—must not induce it to disregard justice, and to seek self-fulfillment through the destruction of other nations.
Yet it was Ahad Ha’am whose name, along with that of the biblical Prophets, graced the pathway by which one entered the world of Massad. Such, I suppose, is the philosophy of “ulamot,” a pursuit whose origins I trace to Massad. We doubled back to Ulam Fishman. I was struck by how poor the condition of the paint was on the main ulamot; clearly the Bobover had not kept up the aesthetics of the camp.

The newer ulamot, like Fishman, had been built with natural knotted pine exteriors, with only a coating of shellac; the Bobover had painted them over. We entered Fishman, the site of so many machazot—remember Zev? “Hamelech erom kemo bameeklachat!” Here was the stage where I had been Mook Hakatan, Smee the Pirate, and a colleague of Bambi. It was on this stage that I first debuted, under Effie Buchwald’s tutelage, in the Ashpot, an all-male quartet which rendered Erev Shel Shoshanim in four-part harmony, while sitting on upside down garbage cans. It was here that Meir had led us in soulful Havdalah. But the stage had been removed, and the natural ceiling had been replaced with soundproofed tile and air conditioning. A porch-like abutment had been added to the room, with a waste-high wall separating it from the rest of the room: we quickly realized it was the women’s gallery, separated by mechitzah. But the beemah remained in the center, the hand-carved wood surrounding the Aron Kodesh, the original maroon carpeting and drape still in their place. A fragment of the letter “heh” had been lost from the carved epigram on the left side of the Aron: “Vehagita Bo Yomam Valayla Ve’az Taskil.” We walked past the Seefreeah, and settled down on the wooden benches in front, arrayed in a circle.

Finally we had reached our starting point, having come full circle: everywhere we turned, we knew Maccabiah might suddenly break out! By the Marpeah, multi-colored leaflets dropped from the roof; in front of Senesh, Kennedy or the agam, scattered from a low-flying plane. But only the chirping of birds broke the silence. We now stood before the Lishka Merkazeet. The door was unlocked. A building permit warned that the small structure could not be occupied until various repairs and improvements had been made. We entered nonetheless. The office was in epic disarray: these Jews must not have had time even to bake matzah before their sudden departure! Files and papers were splayed about with abandon throughout the room where Sue Moskowitz and Shlomo once sat. On the wall we spied it: a map of Camp Massad Beth, drawn in commemoration of its 25th year, Yovel HaKaf Heh, in 1965. Feeling like archeologists excavating a prior Jewish civilization, we gently removed the large yellowed map from the wall. The Bobover don’t need this. Let them draw their own map. We liberated it in memory of Mahane Massad, and all those who made it what it was.

Before leaving, we stumbled upon a statement from the Pennsylvania Pike County Assessor’s office, announcing to the camp’s owners that it’s value had been reassessed at four times its previous value: some $2.2 million. We speculated that the new building had increased the real estate tax liability of the camp, and that the Bobover could no longer afford to operate it. All indications were they had abandoned the camp in 1996. Upon my return home, I found the latest issue of Moment magazine waiting at my doorstep, which reported that two rabbis of the Bobover Hassidim had just been indicted on Federal charges of conspiring to “launder” $1.75 million in drug money! One was a former rosh yeshiva. These rabbis had sought to help their communities—if true, an evil done for noble ends. Chas veshalom! HaKadosh Baruch Hu works in mysterious ways. And yet . . . to all those who pine for the resurrection of Massad on its ancestral soil, take heart: the Bobover may be in trouble; Massad might be bought for a song. May it rise again like a phoenix from the ashes, b’ezrat Hashem. Shayneet Massad Lo Yeepol!