Thursday, October 5, 2006

Bush and Israel: With Friends Like These, Pittsburgh Jewish Chronicle

Bush and Israel: With Friends Like These

By

Gidon D. Remba

October 4, 2006

Published in the Pittsburgh Jewish Chronicle

If we’re to believe the Republican Jewish Coalition, President George W. Bush is the best friend Israel has ever had. “George Bush is right to stand up to those who have waged a war of terror on the world’s civilized nations,” boasts the RJC. “Whether it’s Iran, Hezbollah or Al Qaeda, President Bush has refused to back down.”

But take a closer look: In fact, Bush’s Mideast policies have done more to endanger the security of Israel than those of any president in history. Ever. The Bush Administration has caused Israel's gravest threats almost literally to mushroom: Iran’s clandestine nuclear weapons program fast approaches the point of no return. Its militant Lebanese Shiite ally Hezbollah, armed with the latest Iranian, Syrian and Russian high-tech weapons systems, launched an unprecedented 4,000 rockets against northern Israel for an entire month, forcing a million Israelis to flee or hide in shelters, while fighting the IDF in a conflict most Israelis now view as a loss for Israel. 68% of Israelis believe that the Lebanon war has weakened Israel's deterrence in the Arab world, while only 23% feel the country’s deterrence posture was strengthened, according to a recent Tel Aviv University opinion survey.

Iran-backed Islamic Jihad joined the Sunni terror group Hamas to rain hundreds of rockets on communities in southern Israel, while Hamas, emulating Hezbollah’s “success” and with its help, is building underground bunkers and smuggling long-range rockets, advanced anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles into Gaza, and eventually the West Bank. The newly empowered Shiite-dominated government and militias in Bush’s new Iraq, together with Hezbollah, form the molten core of a pro-Iranian Shiite eruption sweeping the region, emboldening oil-rich nuclearizing Iran, threatening to destabilize America’s Sunni Arab allies from Egypt to Jordan, Saudi Arabia to the Gulf emirates.

Fueled by Syria and Iran, Hamas waged war on Israel from Gaza after wresting control of the Palestinian Authority, while Sunni jihadist groups inspired by Al Qaeda are proliferating globally, reports the latest National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), representing the consensus of all sixteen US intelligence bodies. The NIE warns that “threats to U.S. interests at home and abroad will become more diverse, leading to increasing attacks worldwide.” Al Qaeda itself has spread to areas surrounding Israel, mounting attacks in Lebanon, Jordan, Gaza and the Egyptian Sinai, a gathering threat to the Jewish state. Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Osama Bin Laden's deputy, celebrated the fifth anniversary of 9/11 by announcing that Israel was among Al-Qaida's next targets.

The Bush Administration came to power drunk on the fantasy that the US could forcibly mold a more America-friendly “New Middle East,” where Islamist terrorists and their state sponsors in Iraq, Iran and Syria would be rolled back. The overthrow of Saddam and the imposition of democracy in Iraq would set in motion the fall of the radical dominoes, with a little nudge from bonus US military assaults against rogue states as needed. The Islamist radicals vanquished, pro-America moderates would emerge triumphant, paving the way for Arab-Israeli peace. Sworn to steer clear of land-for-peace bargaining, the Bush administration dodged any serious talks between Israel and its neighbors until the US had decisively tipped the balance of power in the region against the extremists.

But things didn’t quite work out that way. Instead, precisely the opposite scenario has unfolded. “The Iraq jihad is shaping a new generation of terrorist leaders and operatives,” concludes the NIE. “The Iraq conflict has become the cause célèbre for jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of U.S. involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for the global jihadist movement.” Yet the Bush Administration remains in an ostrich-like state of denial, as told in Bob Woodward’s new chronicle. Bush’s dogmatic devotion to remaking the Middle East by force of arms, and studied refusal to support diplomatic engagement—with Palestinian moderates, Syria or Iran—has cost Israel and America dearly.

Item: The hard-line former IDF Chief of Staff Lt-Gen Moshe Ya’alon recently told Ha’aretz: “In the summer of 2003 I suggested to Prime Minister Sharon that he accede to the requests of [Syrian President] Bashar Assad and enter into negotiations with him. I thought that the very existence of negotiations with Syria on the future of the Golan Heights would crack the northern alignment of Iran-Syria-Hezbollah and perhaps also cause its dismantlement… Even if we did not reach a land-for-peace agreement, the very fact of the renewal of the dialogue channel with Syria would have distanced it from Iran and would have weakened the northern alignment, which I defined as a strategic threat.”

A group of prominent neocons who rose to high positions in the Bush Administration had long rejected “land for peace” deals on the Golan Heights in favor of regime-toppling military adventures, publicly suggesting after Iraq that Syria was next. Even had he been so inclined, Sharon could hardly have contemplated negotiations with Syria given the Bush Administration’s wish to depose Assad. Nor would Bush seize the initiative to bring Sharon along in a US-led rapprochement with Syria, conditional on ending its material support for Hezbollah, Hamas and Iraqi insurgents in exchange for renewed peace talks with the US and Israel. The arming of Hezbollah and Hamas continued apace, setting the stage for this summer’s bold Islamist attacks on Israel’s north and south.

Item: Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas’ Fatah party, which spearheaded the Oslo peace accords with Israel, has worked to renew negotiations and end all violence. Much as Hezbollah had pushed Israel out of Lebanon in 2000, Hamas has flaunted its success in forcing Israel to withdraw from Gaza last summer with no Palestinian peace or security recompense. Loath to truck in Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy, Bush did little to help Abbas gain credit for Israel’s departure from Gaza. When faced with Hamas’ growing popularity, Abbas sought to postpone Palestinian elections to give his moderate party time to regroup, Bush, the great democratizer, would not hear of it. A Former PA cabinet minister from Fatah told our delegation this summer that Bush insisted Abbas proceed on schedule with democratic Palestinian elections. Hamas won, Fatah lost—another victory for the American leader who stands strong against terror and “appeasement.”

Item: Maj.-Gen. (res.) Giora Eiland, the outgoing director of Israel’s National Security Council, lamented to the Jerusalem Post last week: “In the end, Iran will attain a nuclear capability. The international opportunities of a few years ago were not exploited, and today it’s too late. I don’t see the [international diplomatic] processes unfolding now as being strong enough to stop them, or even to temporarily suspend them.” “America is going to have to learn to live with a nuclear Iran, US intelligence analysts have concluded at a secret meeting near Washington,” echoed the London Times. “Senior operatives and outside experts from the intelligence community were almost unanimous in their view that little could be done to stop Iran acquiring the components for a nuclear bomb,” as Pentagon and intelligence analysts have warned the administration that a military strike on Iran, and economic sanctions, would both fail.

Item: In the spring of 2003, Iran sent Washington a detailed proposal for comprehensive negotiations to resolve all outstanding differences, including its suspected nuclear weapons programs and aid to anti-Israeli terrorist organizations. “The proposal was presented as having support from all major players in Iran's power structure, including the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei,” according to former senior CIA Mideast analyst Flynt Leverett. Iran’s opening positions in the proposed negotiation were spelled out:

“1. WMD: full transparency for security that there are no Iranian endeavors to develop or possess WMD, full cooperation with IAEA based on Iranian adoption of all relevant instruments,” allowing spot intrusive inspections of suspected nuclear facilities anywhere in Iran.
“2. Terrorism: decisive action against any terrorists (above all Al Qaida) on Iranian territory, full cooperation and exchange of all relevant information.
“3. Iraq: coordination of Iranian influence for activity supporting political stabilization and the establishment of democratic institutions and a non-religious government.
“4. Middle East:

1) stop of any material support to Palestinian opposition groups (Hamas, Jihad etc.) from Iranian territory, pressure on these organizations to stop violent action against civilians within borders of 1967.
2) action on Hizbollah to become a mere political organization within Lebanon [Iran would disarm its Shiite militia in Lebanon]
3) acceptance of the Arab League Beirut declaration (Saudi initiative, two-states-approach)”—committing Iran to peace between all Arab states and Israel.

True to form, Bush spurned the Iranian 2003 offer of direct negotiations, leaving Israel, and the world, in a far more dangerous and disadvantageous position today. With friends like these…

Thursday, September 7, 2006

Pax Syriana Redux, by Gidon D. Remba

Pax Syriana Redux

By

Gidon D. Remba

Pittsburgh Jewish Chronicle
September 7, 2006

No sooner had the Lebanon cease-fire taken hold when Israel’s Defense Minister Amir Peretz proposed peace talks with Syria. The critics pounced on him forthwith: the novice minister, notorious for his lack of security experience, “jumped the gun,” showing that he had as much to learn about the art of diplomacy as he did about the art of war.

But was it Peretz’s want of diplomatic and security credentials that accounted for the novitiate minister’s call for talks with Syria? Soon after Peretz spoke, Avi Dichter, Israel’s hawkish Internal Security Minister and former chief of the Shin Bet, Israel’s General Security Service, opined: “In exchange for peace with Syria, Israel can leave the Golan Heights…[returning] to the international border. We have paid similar territorial prices for peace with Jordan and Egypt.”

“A process of discussions with Syria is legitimate…and very suitable,” he went on. “Israel can initiate it. Ultimately, initiatives of this kind are [conducted by] a third party - and there is an abundance of third parties in the world. If a third party approaches us, we must reply in the affirmative. Any political process is preferable to a military-fighting process, be it with Syria or with Lebanon,” concluded Dichter.

Echoing Peretz, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni suddenly appointed Ya’akov Dayan as a special “project manager” for possible negotiations with Syria. Dayan wasted no time meeting with officials who headed Israel’s Syrian negotiations team under Prime Ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Ehud Barak in the mid and late 1990s. Dayan has been tasked with presenting Livni “with a document detailing the chances for resuming the diplomatic dialogue with Syria in light of Syrian and Israeli positions on …borders, security and normalization,” reported Ha’aretz. Knesset Member Danny Yatom, a former Mossad director and chief of the IDF’s Central Command, has been among those in the Labor Party calling for engagement with Syria.

Prime Minister Olmert, portrayed by some as having slapped down any diplomatic exchange with Syria, actually left the door ajar: “I will negotiate only when Syria undergoes fundamental change with regard to its open support for terrorism.” If Syria stopped aiding Hezbollah and Hamas, Olmert was indicating Israel’s readiness to resume the peace talks aborted in 2000. Now Peretz has again urged that Israel “do everything possible to create the conditions for a dialogue with the Palestinians and on the Syrian front as well.”

Were Peretz’s remarks the musings of a dilettante? If so, he was in illustrious company. Were Peretz, Dichter, Olmert and Livni’s moves nothing more than the uncoordinated ramblings of unruly and irresponsible ministers? Or did they reflect a recognition among many in the Israeli government that the strategic benefits for Israel of a resumption of talks with Syria could be unparalleled?

Why now? Why would the Israeli government signal openness to Syria in the wake of a war with Hezbollah that looked, at best, like a Pyrrhic victory for Israel, and at worst like a win for Hezbollah? The timing of Israel’s message could not have been more propitious. It was, if anything, long overdue. If the cease-fire is to hold, if Hezbollah’s “victory” is to be transformed into a resounding defeat, if Israel is to snatch political triumph from the uncertain jaws of combat, there could be no greater boon to Israeli security than to offer Syria a potent political incentive to dry up Hezbollah’s weapons flow from Iran and Syria, to withdraw Syria’s backing for Hamas and re-align itself with the West, isolating Iran. The US and Israel adopted just such a strategy when Egypt was wooed away from the Soviet orbit into a peace treaty with Israel and an alliance with the US three decades ago. With the promise of US and European economic rewards, and the prospect of regaining the Golan Heights taken by Israel from Syria in the 1967 war, Bashar Assad, the young Syrian president, might achieve for his nation what his father Hafez had failed to accomplish in a lifetime.

It behooves us to recall that before Egyptian President Anwar Sadat issued his public offer to talk peace with Israel in Jerusalem, Prime Minister Begin sent messages to Sadat through various secret channels via President Carter and Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu that Israel was prepared to make major territorial concessions in return for a full peace treaty, and inviting Sadat to meet Begin. Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan traveled incognito to Morocco to meet Sadat’s deputy prime minister, Hasan Tuhami, who informed Sadat that Israel would agree to a complete withdrawal from the Sinai in exchange for full peace. The secret diplomacy gave Sadat the confidence to issue his public offer to talk peace with Israel, leading to his historic visit and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

If such behind-the-scenes messages are not being carried by third parties between Israel and Syria today, they will be tomorrow. These efforts, combined with the Israeli government’s public willingness to entertain full withdrawal for full peace with Syria and a resumption of negotiations, are the best way to examine Syria’s intentions. If Assad stanches Hezbollah’s weapons flow, and his rhetoric softens, we can expect the clandestine dialogue—and the public denials—to intensify, and Assad to take further steps forward, leading eventually to an eruption of overt diplomacy.

Only a rank political and military amateur would fail to thoroughly test the waters now for prying Syria away from Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas, dealing a body blow to radical Islamism. There is no task more urgent. But will the Bush Administration abandon reckless fantasies of Syrian regime change—which could bring Islamists to power or chaos—and play ball?

Tuesday, August 8, 2006

Mideast Peace--The Tough Dove Way, Gidon D. Remba

Mideast Peace—The Tough Dove Way

Pittsburgh Jewish Chronicle, August 8, 2006

By

Gidon D. Remba

Israel is fighting a just and necessary war against the Islamic fascists of Hezbollah and Hamas, backed by Iran and Syria. Virtually the entire Israeli public—95% according to the polls—is behind Israel’s war of self-defense, left, right and center, including Peace Now, the movement of Israeli pragmatists which I have supported ever since its founding by a group of 348 reserve IDF officers in 1978 during the ground-breaking Egyptian-Israeli peace talks.

Shalom Achshav, as it is known in Hebrew, has never been a movement of pacifists, but a mainstream force of Israeli realists who believe that Israel must pursue peace with its Arab neighbors as aggressively and tough-mindedly as it prosecutes its just wars. Peace agreements—buttressed by a powerful military able to defeat aggressors and deter future attack—form an essential part of Israel’s security bulwark. Israel’s peace treaty with Egypt ended the series of multi-front wars Israel suffered during the first twenty-five years of its existence. The peace treaty with Jordan a decade ago has helped keep Israel’s eastern flank secure from cross-border terror attacks and ground assaults from radical Arab states. Shalom Achshavniks, in short, are tough doves; or, in the words of Israel’s former Chief of Military Intelligence Yehoshafat Harkabi, Machiavellian doves. (Yes, Harkabi too was one of us, along with a fair number of contemporary Israeli generals, intelligence and security officials).

But in the ornithology of Mideast war and peace, doves must sometimes fly like hawks, protecting Israel by the sword when necessary. That’s why, for me, some of the paragons of the Peace Now way also happen to be among Israel’s most illustrious war heroes, men like Yitzhak Rabin, Moshe Dayan, Ezer Weizman, and even Ariel Sharon, who though hawk’s hawks for much of their careers, all became tough doves, each in his way (and if only imperfectly). Some have even dubbed Israel’s military campaigns in Lebanon and Gaza the first Peace Now-run wars. Defense Minister Amir Peretz is, after all, a veteran leader in Shalom Ashchav, while other dovish cabinet ministers from the Labor Party, like Education Minister Yuli Tamir, one of the movement’s co-founders, have been among the war’s most vocal champions.

If the UN cease-fire fails, Israel should hit Hezbollah hard with an expanded ground campaign, push its Katyusha rockets north of the Litani River beyond firing range of much of Israel, paving the way for the entry into southern Lebanon of a large, well-armed NATO-led multi-national force to oversee the Lebanese army. Israel should decimate Hezbollah’s ranks and weapons, inflicting a painful blow on Iran’s proxy militia for its chronic aggression. But while it fights and once the guns fall silent, Israel should apply diplomatic leverage as well, and on three fronts: Lebanon, Syria and the West Bank and Gaza.

Hezbollah has used Israel’s continued control over the Shaba Farms, which the UN certified as part of the Golan Heights, as a pretext to continue its attacks against the Jewish state since the IDF withdrew from southern Lebanon in 2000. The Bush Administration appears to have concluded that it would promote Israel’s security and regional stability if Israel ceded the Shaba Farms to the UN. The IDF would redeploy from this small area and permit the new NATO-led force to patrol it, along with all of southern Lebanon and the Syria-Lebanon border (replacing the feckless UNIFIL toy soldiers). The UN Security Council would ultimately turn the territory over to Syria, as part of an exchange for verified Syrian cooperation with a truce in Lebanon and blocking the re-armament of Hezbollah. Syria, which has long displayed a willingness to transfer the area to Lebanon, would proceed to do so, giving Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora a powerful political tool to galvanize the Lebanese public against Hezbollah and its remaining weapons.

There are those who claim that giving the Shaba Farms to Lebanon via Syria is tantamount to surrendering land in response to Hezbollah’s attack on Israel, thus rewarding aggression and violating the international law principle that territory should not be acquired by dint of war. But this objection is off the mark. Syria and Lebanon would receive a sliver of land in exchange for their full cooperation in disarming Hezbollah, accepting a potent multi-national force to patrol southern Lebanon and their common border, preventing new arms from reaching Hezbollah from Iran. This moralistic and legalistic objection, as is so often the case with rightist complaints, ignores what’s best for Israel’s security.

What’s best for Israel’s security is for the U.S. and Israel to drive a wedge between Syria and Iran, isolating Hezbollah’s patron Iran and providing Syria with Western economic and political incentives in trade for its willingness to cut Hezbollah off cold. Those rewards should include a renewal by Israel and the US of the aborted talks with Syria over a land for peace deal in the Golan Heights, talks during which Syria had agreed to “dismantle Hezbollah” as part of a peace treaty. Perhaps it would be the same cold peace that Israel achieved with Egypt. We, and Israel, should be quite content with that, the best of many far worse options. As Prime Minister Menachem Begin used to say, “I’ll take a cold peace over a hot war any day.” Don’t trust the Syrians or the Lebanese? Me neither. Let’s take a page from Ronald Reagan’s book on the Russians: don’t trust, verify (with a twenty thousand-strong combat-hardened NATO force). Hold the Syrians’ feet to the fire when they make sweet promises. Give them some carrots, and speak softly, but carry a very large, bayonet-tipped stick. Make peace—the tough dove way.

Friday, July 21, 2006

Are Israel's Military Operations in Lebanon Proportional? Is Israel Guilty of War Crimes?
What International Law Really Says

Revised July 21, 2006

Gidon D. Remba

Posted on website of Ameinu at http://www.ameinu.net/perspectives/israel.php?articleid=106 and widely cited in the press
Referring to the Hezbollah-Israel conflict, UN Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour has said that indiscriminate shelling of cities is a war crime; presumably this is meant to apply to Hezbollah's indiscriminate rocket and missile fire on Israeli cities. The Swiss International Red Cross, the "guardian" of the Geneva Conventions, has been explicit in saying that “Hezbollah fighters too are bound by the rules of international humanitarian law, and they must not target civilian areas."

But Arbour also has said, presumably with regard to Israeli strikes on civilian areas which harbor military objectives--such as rockets or armed Hezbollah guerrillas in private homes, villages or urban areas--that "the bombardment of sites with alleged military significance, but resulting invariably in the killing of innocent civilians, is unjustifiable," and she has implied that such actions are war crimes for which military and political leaders may be held liable under international criminal law. But is it true that Israeli actions in Lebanon are "unjustifiable" under international law? Is Israel guilty of war crimes, as Arbour suggests?

Both Protocol I and Article 28 of the Geneva Convention (IV) make clear that "the deliberate intermingling of civilians and combatants, designed to create a situation in which any attack against combatants would necessarily entail an excessive number of casualties is a flagrant breach of the Law of International Armed Conflict," according to international law scholar Yoram Dinstein (see his The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 129 - 130). In short, Hezbollah is in violation of the laws of war when it places missiles and rockets in villages and homes in order to shield them from Israeli attack.

Article 51(7) of Protocol I states: "The presence or movements of the civilian population or individual civilians shall not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations, in particular attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield, favour or impede military operations." And the Geneva Convention (IV) holds that "The presence of a protected person may not be used to render certain points of areas immune from military operations." (Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949, Laws of Armed Conflicts, 495, 511.) Moreover, the Rome Statute is clear that "utilizing the presence of civilians or other protected persons to render certain points, areas or military forces immune from military operations is recognized as a war crime by Article 8 (2) (b) (xxiii)". (Dinstein, p. 130)

At the same time, Dinstein acknowledges that the principle of proportionality applies even in such cases when a belligerent has committed the war crime of using a civilian objective to shield its military forces or weapons from attack. "However, even if that is the case," he notes, "the actual test of excessive injury to civilians must be relaxed. That is to say, the appraisal whether civilian casualties are excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated must make allowances for the fact that -- if an attempt is made to shield military objectives with civilians -- civilian casualties will be higher than usual." (p. 131) Dinstein cites, inter alia, legal scholar L. Doswald-Beck who wrote regarding Israel's original Lebanon War in the Journal of Peace Research: "The Israeli bombardment of Beirut in June and July of 1982 resulted in high civilian casualties, but not necessarily excessively so given the fact that the military targets were placed amongst the civilian population."

The above considerations pertain to the norms deriving from treaty law (e.g., the Geneva Conventions). But there is another set of standards which are relevant to the question of proportionality which derive from another source of international law, known as customary international law. Together with treaties, customary law is one of the main sources of international humanitarian law (IHL), or the laws of war. Dinstein explains that "Customary international law is certainly more rigorous than the [Geneva] Protocol on this point. It has traditionally been perceived that, should civilian casualties ensue from an attempt to shield combatants or a military objective, the ultimate responsibility lies with the belligerent [party] placing innocent civilians at risk. A belligerent...is not vested by the laws of international armed conflict with the power to block an otherwise legitimate attack against combatants (or military objectives) by deliberately placing civilians in harm's way." (Dinstein, ibid). In short, Hezbollah is legally (and morally) responsible for any Lebanese civilian casualties which result from Israeli bombardment of villages, homes or urban areas containing missiles, rockets or armed Hezbollah guerrilla forces—so long as Israel is aiming at these military targets, as it has.

Dinstein further notes that "An obvious breach of the principle of proportionality would be the destruction of a whole village--with hundreds of civilian casualties--in order to eliminate a single enemy sniper. In contrast, if -- instead of a single enemy sniper -- an artillery battery would operate from within the village, such destruction may be warranted" under the laws of war. (pp. 122-123)

Bridges and Civilian Casualties

Israel has bombed bridges in parts of Lebanon in order to prevent the movement of missiles into firing range of Israeli population centers, to obstruct the re-armament of Hezbollah, and to prevent Hezbollah from spiriting its captured soldiers to the Iranian Embassy, to Syria or Iran. Dinstein notes that under the international law of armed conflict, "most bridges qualify as military objectives by purpose, use or above all, location...As long as they are apt to have a perceptible role in the transport of military reinforcements and supplies, their destruction is almost self-explanatory as a measure playing havoc with enemy logistics." (p. 92). Moreover, "given the significant military advantage that can generally be gained from the destruction of a strategically located bridge, relatively high civilian casualties would ordinarily be deemed reasonable collateral damage." (p. 125)

Advance Warning Before Attacking Military Targets in Areas Affecting Civilians

Article 57(2) of Protocol I of the Geneva Convention, like the Hague Convention of 1907, "prescribes that effective advance warning must be given of attacks affecting the civilian population, 'unless circumstances do not permit'...Warnings are designed 'to allow, as far as possible, civilians to leave a locality before it is attacked.'" (Dinstein, pp. 127-8) Israel has repeatedly given advance warning to civilians in areas containing military objectives it plans to target: in south Beirut, before it attacked the Hezbollah stronghold, it gave at least 48 hours advance warning via airdropped leaflets, and it did the same with civilians in southern Lebanon, an area from which Hezbollah has been indiscriminately launching rockets at Israeli civilians within Israel, and where Hezbollah guerrillas have built fortifications and store arms.

The Assessment of Proportionality

Several conclusions follow from this review of the international law of armed conflict. First, the international laws of war permit considerable civilian casualties and harm to civilians of various kinds within the ambit of lawful combat, so long as a combatant fulfills its conditions. Second, the principle of proportionality prohibits an attack on a legitimate military target only if the collateral civilian casualties would be disproportionate in relation to the specific military gain anticipated from the attack. An attack against a legitimate military target is a war crime if the incidental loss of civilian life is "excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated." (Article 51 (5) (b) of Protocol I; Article 8 (2) (b) (iv) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court). Dinstein notes that "Even extensive civilian casualties may be acceptable, if they are not excessive in light of the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated." (p. 121) He further notes that "the Protocol refers to expected injury to civilians and to anticipated military advantage....what ultimately counts in appraising whether an attack which engenders incidental loss of civilian life or damage to civilian objects is 'excessive,' is not the actual outcome of the attack but the initial expectation and anticipation."

Leonard Fein's new essay on the Americans for Peace Now website "Disproportionality Now" fails to take into account many of the key considerations which the laws of war mandate for assessing whether the harm caused to civilians is proportional. He does, correctly, raise the question of what military advantages are likely to be gained by Israel's campaign against Hezbollah, but for reasons I shall not elaborate upon in this essay, I think his assessment of the military and strategic gains which may be reasonably expected from Israel's campaign is unduly pessimistic. That, however, is a largely empirical question which won't be settled until we see the outcome of the campaign. But for reasons I've elaborated elsewhere, I believe it is not unreasonable to hold that Israel will achieve some significant military and strategic gains from this operation: These include:

1) pushing Hezbollah guerrillas back from its northern border, preventing further abductions and attacks on IDF forces within Israel (Israel is already engaged in ground operations in southern Lebanon to this end);
2) pushing Hezbollah's thousands of Katyushas beyond 12 miles of the border so that northern Israel's population centers are beyond their 12-mile range;
3) the imposition of an effective multinational force along with the Lebanese army in southern Lebanon to replace the IDF and Hezbollah, thereby implementing a key provision in UNSC resolutions 1559 and 1680, and an international monitoring regime in the Bekaa Valley and the Beirut airport to prevent Hezbollah's rearmament, a proposal which has now won support from the US and several major powers;
4) reducing the number of missile launchers and longer-range missiles available to Hezbollah (it had only 62 Zelzal missiles threatening Tel Aviv and central Israel, and only 75 Fajr-3 and -5 missiles threatening Haifa, Israel's two most strategically important cities other than Jerusalem, before firing some and losing others to Israeli strikes);
5) restoration of a modicum of the deterrence which Israel lost after it unilaterally withdrew from Lebanon and Gaza to the international border, and failed to retaliate to previous Hezbollah abductions. This will
a) create a disincentive against future attacks by Hezbollah and Iran, both of which harbor genocidal intent against Israel and its people, and
b) foster the confidence necessary among the Israeli public for further withdrawal of Israeli settlements (though not of the IDF at this point) from as much as 90% or more of the West Bank, with such evacuations coordinated or negotiated with the Palestinians; such steps will, as the Israeli government has said, safeguard Israel's democratic and Jewish character, represent a giant step towards resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and promote the prospects for a future peace accord with its Palestinian neighbors;
6) dealing a blow to Iran's efforts to gain leverage over the major powers in talks over its nuclear enrichment program, while thwarting its attempts to enhance its stature in the Arab world over the moderate Arab states, by using Hezbollah to threaten and bleed Israel;
7) blocking Iran's efforts to sabotage Palestinian-Israeli accommodation by inflicting a strategic setback to Hezbollah through achievement of the above objectives.

All these are realistic potential outcomes of Israel's operation, achievable to some degree.

Anticipated vs. Actual Outcome of Military Actions and Proportionality

Dinstein also notes that in making judgments as to the proportionality of an attack, "if an extensive air campaign is undertaken, it would be mistaken to focus on the outcome of an isolated sortie. It has been rightly emphasized that, pursuant to Article 8 (2) (b)(iv) of the Rome Statute, assessment of what is excessive is to be based on 'overall' military advantage anticipated. By introducing the word 'overall', the Statute 'somewhat broadens the scope of military advantages which may be taken into account': it permits looking at the larger operational picture and not merely at the particular point under attack." (Dinstein, p. 123) It seems clear that the anticipated military and strategic gains, which include better protecting from rocket and missile attack more than 2 million Israelis--and with Tel Aviv and central Israel, virtually the country's entire population of 7 million--must be factored into any judgments about the proportionality of Israel's operations against Hezbollah.

Conclusion

From all this it follows that it is a categorical mistake to simply count the number of civilian Lebanese casualties, and then ask--is this too many in relation to whether Israel can "destroy Hezbollah", as the appropriate way for evaluating the proportionality of Israel's military actions in Lebanon. It is a mistake for at least two reasons: first, because it is arbitrary and unreasonable to treat "the destruction of Hezbollah," and Israel's inability to attain this objective, as the sole military advantage which should enter into the calculus; and second, because the absolute number of civilian casualties resulting from Israel's actions, while not irrelevant to that calculus, is not the primary determinant of proportionality in international law. This is so because the moral and legal responsibility for many of those casualties under international law falls squarely on Hezbollah. Many more of those civilian casualties are also permitted as proportionate under the laws of war even though they sometimes represent a considerable number, in absolute terms.

As horrible as it is for us to see hundreds of thousands of civilians fleeing from the war zone--and we should support immediate humanitarian assistance to the 45,000 of these (and all others) who need it--Israel has committed no war crime by taking action against legitimate Hezbollah military targets which it has willfully placed within urban and other civilian areas. This is all the more so given that Israel has fully complied with the laws of war by giving sufficient warning to the Lebanese civilians affected by its operations against Hezbollah military targets. The law may seem to some to be insufficiently morally sensitive. But so long as we cannot--and must not, morally--embrace pacifism, we must accept the tragic fact that even the most just wars may result in many civilian casualties—foreseeably and unintentionally—yet justifiably, with the full and terrible weight of law and morality.

__________________________________________________________________________

Gidon D. Remba, co-author of the forthcoming From Gaza to Jerusalem: A New Road to Middle East Peace?, served as senior foreign press editor and translator in the Israeli Prime Minister's Office during the Egyptian-Israeli Camp David peace process. His essays have appeared in the Chicago Tribune, the Chicago Sun Times, the New York Times, the Nation, the Jerusalem Report, Forward, Tikkun, the Jewish Journal of Los Angeles, JUF News and the Pittsburgh Jewish Chronicle. Mr. Remba is President of Chicago Peace Now (http://www.chicagopeacenow.org/), affiliated with Americans for Peace Now (http://www.peacenow.org/).

The views in this essay are solely his own and in no way represent the views of any organization.

July 20, 2006
New York Times
Attacks Qualify as War Crimes, Officials Say
By WARREN HOGE
Correction Appended
UNITED NATIONS, July 19 — The United Nations’ top human rights official said Wednesday that the killing and maiming of civilians under attack in Lebanon, Israel and Gaza and the West Bank could constitute war crimes.
“The scale of killings in the region, and their predictability, could engage the personal criminal responsibility of those involved, particularly those in a position of command and control,” said Louise Arbour, the high commissioner for human rights.
Ms. Arbour is a former justice of Canada’s Supreme Court who, as chief prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, indicted the former Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic.
“International humanitarian law is clear on the supreme obligations to protect civilians during hostilities,’’ she said. That same obligation exists, she added, in international criminal law, which defines war crimes and crimes against humanity.
“Indiscriminate shelling of cities constitutes a foreseeable and unacceptable targeting of civilians,” she said in a statement released by her Geneva office. “Similarly, the bombardment of sites with alleged innocent civilians is unjustifiable.”
The Swiss-based International Red Cross, the recognized guardian of the Geneva Conventions on the conduct of war, said Wednesday that Israel had violated the principle of proportionality provided for in the Conventions and their protocols.
It also noted that Hezbollah was firing rockets into northern Israel. “Hezbollah fighters too are bound by the rules of international humanitarian law, and they must not target civilian areas,” it said.
At the United Nations, there was support for the view that the only way to spare more victims was to halt the fighting, but there was also evidence that the United States would continue to dispute it.
“We think a truce is needed for humanitarian reasons,” said Jean-Marc de la Sablière, the ambassador of France, which holds the rotating presidency of the Security Council.
But John R. Bolton, the American ambassador, said the notion that a cease-fire would solve the problem was “simplistic.” “Among other things,” he said, “I want somebody to address the problem how you get a cease-fire with a terrorist organization.”
“This is a different kind of situation,” he added, “and I’m not sure that sort of old thinking, conventional thinking, works in a case like this.”
Mark Malloch Brown, the deputy secretary general, said that “on humanitarian grounds but also to enable ultimately a sustainable solution to this, one which allows Israel and its neighbors to live in peace with each other, continued conflict does not help.”
Secretary General Kofi Annan was returning to New York from Europe and was scheduled to brief the Council on Thursday on his call for a “cessation of hostilities” and a stabilization force for southern Lebanon.
“The need to bring this to a stop while we find a longer-term political and security solution is one that he will be stressing tomorrow in the Council,” Mr. Malloch Brown said.
Correction: July 21, 2006
An article yesterday about a statement released by Louise Arbour, the United Nations high commissioner for human rights, in which she said that the killing of civilians in the Middle East conflict may constitute war crimes, omitted part of a quotation. The passage, with italics indicating the missing words, should have read: “Indiscriminate shelling of cities constitutes a foreseeable and unacceptable targeting of civilians. Similarly, the bombardment of sites with alleged military significance, but resulting invariably in the killing of innocent civilians, is unjustifiable.”

Sunday, July 2, 2006

Response to a Critic: The Settlements and Convergence for Peace, Letter to the Forward, Gidon D. Remba

Response to a Critic: The Settlements and Convergence For Peace
Letter to the Forward, July 2, 2006

Gidon D. Remba

Leopold Friedman (Letter, June 23) objects to my claim that “metastasizing settlements have long occluded the emergence of a Palestinian polity” in my June 2nd opinion article, “Convergence Towards Peace.” He charges that by implying Israeli settlements in the West Bank are like “cancers,” my use of a medical metaphor is “racist,” given that Jewish claims to the territory are “at least as valid as those of the Palestinians.”

As just as it is in principle, the Jewish historical and moral claim to the entire Land of Israel has in practice fueled a four-decades long settlement juggernaut which is threatening Israel’s existence and the entire Zionist enterprise. Echoing the post-1967 warnings of Israel’s founding father David Ben-Gurion, then-Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was among the first to say in December 2003 that permitting most settlements to remain in the West Bank “will lead to the loss of Israel as a democratic Jewish state.”

More recently, Israel’s Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni has explained: "My need as an Israeli and a Jew is to keep a Jewish homeland for the Jewish people, a sovereign, Jewish and democratic state with a Jewish majority. So how do we [do that]? The idea is to divide the land, to give up some of our rights on the land of Israel and to establish a two-state solution. I came to the conclusion that I cannot implement all of my ideology. I have to choose and my choice was to implement the ideology of a homeland for the Jewish people with equal rights to all the minorities in the land of Israel, but [the homeland will be] only in part of the land of Israel."

57,000 Israelis live in seventy official settlements and over one hundred outposts throughout the West Bank heartland east of the separation barrier. The proliferation of these and other Jewish communities in areas where several million Palestinians seek self-determination has obstructed a two-state solution to the conflict, as intended by their architects. Every U.S. administration for over 25 years, both Republican and Democrat, has viewed the settlements as an obstacle to peace. Countless Israeli generals and IDF chiefs of staff have described them as “security burdens” on Israel, exacerbating tensions between Israelis and Palestinians.

By placing a Jewish minority in control of a Palestinian majority, the territorial maximalism of the Whole Land of Israel movement and its facilitators in both Labor and Likud governments has jeopardized not only Israel’s democratic ethos as a society of equal citizens but its Jewish identity as well. The settlements and the occupation which supports them have transformed Israel, in Olmert’s words, into a country “that controls a large population under conditions of inequality.” Prime Minister Ariel Sharon insisted that “It is…not possible to control densely populated areas for prolonged periods without those populations eventually having to receive rights.” If it fails to remedy this situation, warned Olmert, Israel will become a “pariah state.”

Though I myself have many family and friends living throughout Judea and Samaria, we must face this inescapable fact: the settlement project has become a mortal danger to Israel. Both Prime Minister Olmert and Foreign Minister Livni have stressed that it is the policy of the Israeli government, backed by a solid majority of the Israeli public, to dismantle many West Bank settlements and to draw an interim “security border” between Israelis and Palestinians, preferably by agreement. The government is determined to perform life-saving surgery for the sake of Israel’s survival. My medical metaphor could not have been more apt.

Tuesday, June 13, 2006

Know--and Don't Demonize--the Enemy, Gidon D. Remba

Know—and Don’t Demonize—the Enemy

Pittsburgh Jewish Chronicle

June 13, 2006

By Gidon D. Remba

It’s hard to imagine what more Hamas might do to shore itself up as an enemy of peace with Israel. First it praised an April 17 Islamic Jihad suicide bombing in Tel Aviv which killed 10 Israeli civilians, wounding 70. Now after long resisting Al Qaeda’s pandering invocations of the Palestinian cause for the “Arab street,” Hamas has for the first time cast its lot with reviled jihadi murderer Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, whom the U.S. killed in an airstrike.

What’s more, the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority refuses to curb Qassam rocket fire on civilians in Israeli cities like Sderot. An IDF probe has now concluded that a Hamas bomb, rather than a stray Israeli artillery shell, was responsible for the recent deaths of seven Palestinian civilians, including three children, and the wounding of forty others, among them many children, on a Gaza beach. By indiscriminately firing rockets on cities in Israel from residential areas in Gaza—a Palestinian war crime twice over—Hamas and Islamic Jihad recklessly endanger their own people.

After falsely blaming Israel, Hamas has announced the end of its 16-month old unilateral cease-fire and the resumption of a suicide bombing campaign against Israel. While a revenge attack may help bolster its image among the beleaguered and impoverished Palestinian public, a prolonged descent into warfare with Israel will do Hamas little good. Hamas simply cannot deliver to the Palestinian electorate on its central campaign promise of good governance if security deteriorates on its watch. And if it cannot perform, it will soon lose the coveted power it has gained as the first Islamist party to win a free election and form a government in the Arab world.

If a Hamas-Israel battle is in the offing, a new Hamas unilateral cease-fire may not be far behind. The IDF had previously forecast a series of intermittent truces with Hamas. This time, the question Israeli leaders should be asking is: are there any steps Israel can take which might help the next truce hold?

Former Mossad chief Ephraim Halevi, a hawk’s hawk and Sharon advisor who championed the war with Iraq, has surprised many by cajoling the Israeli government to talk to Hamas. Halevi believes it is a mistake for Israel to insist that Hamas first recognize the Jewish state as a precondition for any discussion. “The shoe is on the other foot,” he explains. “We should recognize them first while holding them [to] account…I think some Hamas leaders are ready to bite the bullet…” Halevi believes that Israel should try to negotiate a long-term truce with Hamas. Under such an arrangement, Hamas may agree to stop renegade groups from firing Qassam rockets at Israel—the very acts which helped unravel the current cease-fire.

An improved version of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s “convergence” of West Bank settlers behind the separation barrier, leaving more than 90% of the territory under Palestinian civil and eventual security control, might serve as a basis for such a deal. But it should be negotiated with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, as Olmert is reportedly considering, rather than with Hamas. If the Israeli blueprint that flows from such talks is acceptable to the PLO and endorsed in a Palestinian referendum, Hamas may feel compelled to cooperate in its implementation. Israel would agree to refrain from expanding settlement blocs on the Israeli side of the barrier, relocating settlers to Israel proper or to vacant apartments in the blocs. It would signal its willingness to offer an equal swap of land in exchange for the settlements it incorporates onto the Israeli side of the fence. True, Israel would be giving up tangible assets in exchange for security promises and recognition. But most Israelis have already concluded that West Bank settlements beyond the blocs are not assets but economic, security and political liabilities for Israel. Moreover, the settlements, built among millions of Palestinians, extend Israeli control over the West Bank, jeopardizing Israel’s Jewish majority, its Zionist mission, and its democratic values, sabotaging prospects for a two-state solution to the conflict.

Ideally, the new Israeli government would prefer to unilaterally consolidate the settlers behind the barrier without negotiations at all. But Israel would be better off receiving security guarantees in exchange for territorial moves, rather than ceding land for nothing. This time around, a multinational force should be put in place to monitor Palestinian compliance, to hold Hamas’ feet to the fire in meeting Palestinian commitments. Far from rewarding terror, Israel would be viewed as reinforcing Hamas moderation while bolstering Abbas and Fatah.

Contrary to popular belief, Hamas is not a monolithic movement. It is divided into two factions, a hardline group with leaders in Damascus and Gaza who spout the familiar anti-Israel rejectionist cant, and a more pragmatic contingent, with leaders based largely in the West Bank. The pragmatists have suggested that Hamas is prepared to recognize Israel and reach a long-term armistice.

Hamas is reportedly working on a new charter which will remove anti-Semitic references and authorize a decades-long truce with Israel. While it may still pay lip service to the dream of Greater Palestine, the new platform will sanction a long-term accommodation with Israel based on a two-state formula. Sheikh Hassan Yussuf, a top Hamas leader in the West Bank, has said: “We can dream about all Palestine being Muslim – like some Israelis dream of a Greater Israel that includes all our lands – but it is not practical. We must take responsibility, along with Abu Mazen and the Palestinian Authority, in taking care of our people. And that means we must negotiate with the Israelis. God created people to live, not to die. We must find an exit. We need a dialog of civilizations, not a clash of civilizations.”

Power may sooner or later accelerate Hamas pragmatism. Facile analogies to Hezbollah’s supposed failure to moderate vis-à-vis Israel, as its political role in Lebanon has grown, are misplaced. Hezbollah, for one thing, is not the ruling party in Lebanon as Hamas is in the West Bank and Gaza. And the forces operating on Hamas, which is heavily dependent on Israel to accomplish its domestic goals for Palestinian government and society, are radically different than those impinging on Hezbollah. Palestinian Prime Minister Ismayil Haniyeh acknowledged recently that Hamas will in time “suit its positions to reality and change.” Perhaps Israel can act to bring that time nearer.

Gidon Remba, co-author of the forthcoming "From Gaza to Jerusalem: A New Road to Middle East Peace?", served as senior foreign press editor and translator in the Israeli Prime Minister's Office during the Egyptian-Israeli Camp David peace process.

Friday, June 2, 2006

Convergence Toward Peace, Gidon D. Remba (The Forward)

Convergence Toward Peace

The Forward, June 2, 2006 (Also published in the Chicago Sun Times)

by Gidon D. Remba

http://www.forward.com/articles/7888

Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's inaugural visit to Washington last week has brought out, in full force, the nattering nabobs of negativism. A host of critics, from former president Jimmy Carter on the left to former CIA chief James Woolsey on the right, are protesting that Olmert's gambit to consolidate settlers behind Israel's West Bank separation barrier cannot lead to peace.

Far from withdrawing, huff the doves, Israel is scheming to unilaterally declare final borders and annex enormous tracts of land it conquered and occupied in war, perhaps as much as half the West Bank. In fact, Olmert's election oratory about unilaterally drawing final borders has already crashed against the shoals of political reality. Both the United States and the European Union have made clear that they are loath to recognize final borders imposed by Israel on the Palestinians. Olmert and associates instead increasingly talk of "interim borders" that would result from Israel moving tens of thousands of settlers from heavily populated Palestinian areas of the West Bank back to Israel and to settlement blocs near the 1967 border.

Dovish critics wrongly discount the prospect that so dramatic a reconfiguration could bring Israelis and Palestinians closer to peace. The Road Map peace plan, endorsed by the United Nations Security Council, calls for the removal of Israeli settlements and the creation of a territorially contiguous Palestinian state with provisional borders, until the parties can agree on final boundaries. Olmert's "convergence" plan, if guided wisely by the United States, can lay the foundations for a two-state solution to the conflict.

Equally misplaced are hawkish fears that the new Israeli government's West Bank strategy will replicate the post-disengagement terrorist mayhem in Gaza. Unlike Gaza, Israel does not envision surrendering control over West Bank border crossings or the Jordanian-Israeli frontier. The Palestinians must live up to security commitments before Israel will entertain wide-ranging West Bank military redeployments involving the transfer of security responsibility.

Olmert has intimated that while several settlement blocs would be further developed, Israel would do so in a way that would not jeopardize the territorial continuity of a future Palestinian state. The Bush administration should work with Israel to define a bright line between acceptable development and expansion that would undermine the hope of Palestinian moderates for a viable state. The metastasizing settlements have long occluded the emergence of a Palestinian polity next to Israel, as Olmert and Ariel Sharon before him have understood.

Doves cry that the 60,000 settlers whom Olmert may ultimately relocate will be encouraged to join "massive settlement blocs that already slice through the Palestinian West Bank," making ever dimmer any hope of territorial continuity. When Sharon proposed that Israel disengage from Gaza, removing all 9,000 settlers and all Israeli troops, detractors objected that he was planning to shift them to the West Bank settlement blocs, which would then be expanded and annexed to Israel. Yet few of the Gaza settlers have gone to the settlement blocs; most have moved back to Israel.

Further, the current settlement blocs near the 1967 line do not, for the most part, threaten Palestinian territorial integrity. They constitute 8%-10% of the West Bank, leaving more than 90% of open geography for an independent Palestine. The present path of Israel's separation barrier follows these contours.

Olmert's vision is to relocate every Israeli who currently resides east of the barrier. This jibes with his recent remark that the Jordan Valley would serve as Israel's security border, an objective that could be served by removing the settlements but keeping Israeli troops there until they could be replaced by an American-led peacekeeping force under a future peace treaty.

The interim boundary that would emerge from Israel's eventual evacuation of settlers from more than 90% of the West Bank would extend just a few percentage points beyond President Clinton's proposed lines, discussed by Palestinian and Israeli leaders in their final round of negotiations at Taba in 2001 following the Camp David summit. Once such negotiations resume, Israel should demonstrate its willingness to move portions of the separation barrier, as Olmert has suggested it would, and offer to compensate the Palestinians with an equal land swap for settlements it wishes to incorporate into its final borders.

Critics pretend that Olmert's plan is already carved in stone. But his concept has not yet been fashioned into concrete form. Opponents tilt at straw men cobbled from election slogans, and their perfervid imaginations. Any separation program is bound to be carried out in phases over a number of years.

Israeli coalition politics may constrain the new Israeli leader from spelling out the full monty at the outset. Steps that now seem controversial to some Israelis will become more palatable if the first act goes well. Idealists, both right and left, are constitutionally disenchanted with incremental change, reminding us that the perfect is often the enemy of the good. But that may be the only kind of progress possible in Levantine quicksands.

It would be best if the separation plan were the fruit of negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians, so that Israeli territorial compromise is met with an achievable Palestinian quid pro quo. Long before Egypt and Israel imagined a peace treaty, Israel disengaged from part of the Sinai in exchange for an Egyptian non-belligerency promise, monitored by a multinational force. The same principle can inspire a Palestinian-Israeli interim arrangement, with Palestinians bolstering the current cease-fire by bringing renegade militias into a formal truce under Jordanian and Egyptian supervision.

Olmert has pledged to negotiate with the Palestinians before considering any unilateral moves. If the Israeli blueprint that flows from talks with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas is acceptable to the Palestine Liberation Organization and endorsed in a Palestinian referendum, Hamas may feel compelled to cooperate in its implementation.

And should negotiations fail, Hamas may well continue to observe a cease-fire with Israel. Its ability to deliver on its central campaign promise of good governance depends on its avoiding a military confrontation with the Jewish state, and with Fatah.

Doves carp that long-term coexistence is unlikely to arise from separation along a fortified barrier scarring the landscape. But Israelis and Palestinians must crawl before they can walk. The barrier and the evacuation of Israeli settlers and checkpoints from the Palestinian heartland can help to ease tensions, prevent Palestinian suicide bombings and Israeli retaliations, and encourage a comprehensive truce — all of which can foster a more stable environment for future peace-building steps and renewed dialogue.

Olmert's critics, with the notable exception of Carter, offer no constructive ideas for leveraging the new Israeli government's determination to reverse four decades of Israeli settlement in much of the West Bank, a giant step toward disentangling Israelis and Palestinians. At worst, any borders resulting from a consolidation of settlers should be viewed as establishing a better starting point for the eventual resumption of final-status talks between the two sides. At best, settlement convergence may jumpstart a welcome new dynamic in the region.

Gidon Remba, co-author of the forthcoming "From Gaza to Jerusalem: A New Road to Middle East Peace?", served as senior foreign press editor and translator in the Israeli Prime Minister's Office during the Egyptian-Israeli Camp David peace process.

Copyright 2006 © The Forward

Please visit here for my response to a critic in the Forward

Friday, May 19, 2006

Judas and the "Israel Lobby", by Gidon D. Remba

Judas and the "Israel Lobby", Jerusalem Report
(Also published as "The 'Israel Lobby' and the Persian Gulf Wars")

JUF NEWS, May 2006
This essay also appeared in the Jerusalem Report as a Viewpoint column in the June 12, 2006 issue.

By Gidon D. Remba

http://www.juf.org/news_public_affairs/article.asp?key=6972

An Egyptian papyrus containing a lost gospel written some 1,700 years ago, The Gospel of Judas, was recently discovered offering an alternate version of the crucifixion of Jesus which, as told by the New Testament, helped fuel centuries of Christian persecution of Jews. Now we learn that when Judas Iscariot turned Jesus over to the Romans, he was acting on orders from Jesus, making Judas not the great traitor, but Jesus’ most favored disciple and his willing collaborator.

Judas had become emblematic of Judaism throughout history, of the Jew who would do anything for money, including betray Christians. The Protocols of the Elders of Zion refined the classical antisemitic image of the treacherous, evil, self-aggrandizing Jew into the modern agent of a conspiracy to subvert the great powers of the world to serve Jewish ends.

Now come two of the most distinguished political scientists in America, John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago, and Stephen Walt of Harvard, to enlighten us in “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy," a “working paper" posted on the website of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, excerpted in the London Review of Books. This new gospel bears the revelation that the US embarked on what is now widely viewed as a disastrous war in Iraq largely thanks to the perverse influence of a vast coalition they dub the “Israel Lobby. "The Lobby," we learn, succeeded in skewing the foreign policy of the United States to wage a war motivated mainly by the desire to make Israel more secure while willfully sacrificing America’s own national interests. It is this "Lobby," consisting of all the major Jewish organizations, pro-Israel media, Christian Zionists and others, the authors warn, which is now pushing America into an unnecessary and catastrophic clash with the fundamentalist Islamic, terrorist supporting and nuclear arming Iran.

But "the Lobby" could not have succeeded in its grand act of perfidy, we further learn, were it not for the presence in high places in the Bush Administration of a coterie of "fervent advocates of the Israeli cause" a small band of neoconservatives, many with ties to Likud," until recently Israel’s dominant right-wing political bloc. The Jewish neocons steered the US military into a Middle East morass out of loyalty to Israel and in betrayal of their sworn duty to serve the U.S. national interest, say these eminent scholars. Indeed, there are Jewish senators and congressmen who work to ensure that US foreign policy supports Israel’s interests," rather than America’s, they charge. The Jewish pro-Likud neocons, and Jewish organizations, left, right and center, have betrayed the United States and its interests. They are, for Mearsheimer and Walt, the Judases of America, who would drag their government into wars to serve their pro-Israel Jewish agenda.

But like the new Judas, the Jewish neocons are no traitors: their affinity to Israel is not the source of their scheme to transform the Middle East by force of arms. Nor is it their Jewishness which caused them, or their many non-Jewish superiors in the administration, from Bush to Cheney, Rumsfeld to Rice, to pursue their Mideast regime change agenda. Like the new Jesus of the Judas Gospel, who is the real prime mover of the action, the Jewish neocons’ Christian leaders have followed a long-standing American tradition of forcibly overthrowing regimes which are hostile to America. Theirs was a gambit to roll back the forces of radicalism and Islamic terrorism in the Arab world by forcibly implanting democracy or America-friendly rule. Their project may be delusional, dangerous and inimical to a clear-headed picture of our best interests, as many now have come to believe. But that same clarity requires us to see that their flawed perspective on America’s security stems from a time-honored worldview shared by Jewish and non-Jewish hawks alike, spawning a hundred years of American military interventions and coups d’etat in over a dozen countries, including oil-rich Iran in 1953.

Despite their reputation as “realists" in foreign policy, Mearsheimer and Walt give short shrift to an array of material interests which many observers see as heavily influencing US global conduct: the need to secure the flow of affordable oil from the Middle East, given the growing US dependence on imported petroleum as an energy source, and to curry favor with Arab states like Saudi Arabia whose oil production affects energy prices and the overall health of the US economy. Dismissing the leverage of the Saudi, US oil and defense industry lobbies on an administration led by a former Texas oilman and the ex-CEO of Halliburton–one of the world's largest providers of products and services to the oil and gas industries, which has reaped billions of dollars in no-bid government contracts for rebuilding Iraq’s oil refineries and other post-war reconstruction–is hardly realistic.

Consider: fully two-thirds of the world’s proven oil reserves lie in just seven Muslim-ruled Persian Gulf countries (Iran and 6 Arab states, with Saudi Arabia and Iraq the top two). Of the seven major Persian Gulf oil producing states, only two were not US allies, and instead were leaders of the radical anti-American front in the Arab and Muslim worlds: Iraq and Iran. Both have sought to dominate their Muslim Arab neighbors in the Persian Gulf, and Israel, as Mearsheimer’s own theory of regional hegemony predicts.

All this is swept under the rug by the new gospel of Mearsheimer and Walt, who prefer to exaggerate Jewish influence by largely blaming Israel and American Jewish leaders for snookering the US into war in Iraq–and next Iran–for Israel’s sake. Their polemic echoes antisemitic stereotypes and diverts our attention from the real motives driving our leaders down the perilous path on which America now finds itself.

___________________________________________________________________________________

Gidon D. Remba, a political analyst specializing in the Arab-Israel conflict, served as Senior Foreign Press Editor in the Israel Prime Minister's Office from 1977-1978 during the Egyptian-Israeli Camp David peace process. Co-author of a forthcoming volume, From Gaza to Jerusalem: A New Road to Middle East Peace?, his essays have appeared in the Chicago Tribune, the Chicago Sun Times, the New York Times, the Nation, the Jerusalem Report, Chicago Jewish News, the Jewish Journal of Los Angeles, JUF News and the Pittsburgh Jewish Chronicle, where he is a columnist on Israel and Jewish affairs.

Tuesday, May 2, 2006

A Secret Letter from the US President to Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

A Secret Letter from the US President to Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

As Published in the Pittsburgh Jewish Chronicle, May 2006

By

Gidon D. Remba

Mr. President,

Your country stands on the precipice of a grave international crisis provoked by the growing and well-founded concerns of the International Atomic Energy Agency and many members of the UN Security Council that Iran is concealing a clandestine nuclear weapons program behind the fig leaf of civilian nuclear energy development.

You ask why it is that “any technical and scientific achievement reached in the Middle East is portrayed as a threat” to Israel. Mr. President, for over two decades, your country has been the world’s most active state sponsor of terrorism and the most malevolent opponent of Arab-Israeli peace. You yourself announce at every turn that Israel “should be wiped off the map,” and have called Israel a “rotten, dried tree” that will be annihilated by “one storm.” Your predecessor, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, has explained that “the use of a nuclear bomb in Israel will leave nothing on the ground, whereas it will only damage the world of Islam.”

You deny the Holocaust of six million Jews and, declaring Israel’s illegitimacy, brazenly suggest that all Israeli Jews “return to Europe,” including the millions whose families hail from Arab countries, of whom you are apparently ignorant. You represent a nation whose ancient Persian forebears—themselves migrants from Europe—conquered Babylon and freed the Jewish people from captivity, permitting their return to the Land of Israel after the destruction of the first Jewish state. It was Persian kings who granted renewed Jewish political and religious autonomy in ancient Israel, leading to the eventual reconstruction of a Second Jewish Commonwealth. This was followed by centuries of Jewish presence in, attachment to, and ultimately mass return to the Holy Land to build a modern Jewish state with the consent of the League of Nations and the U.N. No, Mr. President: Israel is a thriving oak with deep millennial roots in the land, and strong branches extending in alliance to many nations throughout the world.

Saudi Arabia's ambassador to the United States spoke out recently to say that the “horrific genocide of the Holocaust is a historical fact no longer in dispute.” He pointedly reminded you that the Arab world has “made our peace” with the creation of Israel. He emphasized that in 2002 the entire Arab League adopted a Saudi plan committing Arab nations to a peace process that would bring about a two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In that plan, the 22 Arab countries unanimously agreed to normalize relations and make a comprehensive peace with Israel once it leaves the territory occupied in the 1967 Six-Day War; they also called for a just and agreed solution to the refugee problem, without explicitly mentioning a “right of return.”

Mr. President, Hamas itself is undergoing a struggle between its hard line and pragmatist factions; no one knows whether or when it will moderate its positions and talk peace with Israel. Yet every day we hear pronouncements from prominent Hamas members, such as that by Khaled Suleiman, the group’s spokesperson in the Palestinian parliament, who said on May 10: “The Hamas movement is ready to recognize agreements signed with Israel, and in fact recognize Israel, but only within the ‘67 borders.” He further promised that Hamas will “not operate to thwart diplomatic negotiations” conducted by Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas with Israel.

You ask why we and our European allies oppose a Hamas government that was elected by the Palestinian people and which represents their will. You question how we can “justify pressuring the Hamas elected government to recognize the Israeli regime and abandon [armed] struggle and follow the programs of the previous [Fatah] government” of peace talks and recognition of Israel. You ask: “If the current government had run on such a platform, would the people have elected it?”

Mr. President, opinion polls in recent months have consistently shown that three-fourths of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza believe that Hamas should “change its position on the elimination of the state of Israel,” while as many as 84% want a peace agreement with Israel. Democracy is about much more than elections; it requires respect for the fundamental civil, political and human rights and freedoms of the individual, and by extension, of other states and peoples. It is our moral duty as democrats to sanction those who refuse such elementary respect to their neighbors, or their own citizens, even if they come to power through free elections, as fascists, racists and anti-Semites have in other lands. At the same time, we must apply economic pressures wisely, in a way that balances the promotion of peace with humanitarianism.

It is no small irony that you now invoke democratic elections among Palestinians as reflecting the will of the people, insisting that this popular will be honored. Your allies in government have brutally crushed the reform movement in Iran, which gained the backing of over three-quarters of your people in parliamentary elections. Your government’s security forces and kangaroo courts have violently suppressed the reformers, arbitrarily removing reformist legislators from power and disqualifying their candidates.

Mr. President, you note that “history tells us that repressive and cruel governments do not survive.” I could not agree more. Every human rights organization in the world—even the UN General Assembly—has recognized that Iran under the mullahs is guilty of systematic and wanton human rights and civil liberties abuses, placing Iran among the most oppressive governments on earth.

By threatening a United Nations member state with annihilation—and let no one imagine that one can wipe a country off the map without committing genocidal mass killings of its population; by exporting terrorism, subversion and extremism across the Middle East and the globe; by trampling the human rights of your own people; by flouting the near-universal international state support for a just peace with Israel; and by failing to satisfy the deep concerns of many nations and the IAEA that Iran seeks covertly to develop the world’s most horrific and destructive genocidal weapons—you are transforming a great nation, which bears the historic legacy of Persian civilization, into a loathsome outlaw state.

Mr. President, the world will not stand idly by as Iran exploits the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to hatch doomsday weapons.

Thursday, February 16, 2006

Radical Refugees: Hijacking Human Rights
What International Law Really Says About the Palestinian “Right of Refugee Return”

Gidon D. Remba
Among the final status issues explored at the Camp David II summit in July 2000, and at the Taba talks in January 2001—including settlements, territory, Palestinian statehood, Israeli security, water, and Jerusalem—the problem of the Palestinian refugees remains the most nettlesome. The refugee problem cuts to the heart of the national conflict. Palestinians who demand a right of return for as many as four million refugees and their descendants to former villages and homes in Israel subvert the Palestinian claim to accept a two-state solution. The exercise of that right by an appreciable number of refugees would soon sabotage Israel’s Jewish majority, and its character as a Jewish state. Palestinian radicals call for an unfettered right of return under the guise of human rights or international law, which do not sanction these claims. Hussein Ibish, then Communications Director of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, wrote in the New York Times that “the right of return for refugees is guaranteed by all basic human rights treaties;” those who believe otherwise “would have Palestinians renounce their basic human rights to accommodate Jewish ethno-nationalism.” Ibish’s polemic should be seen for what it is: a new attempt to delegitimize the right of Israel to exist by cynical misuse of the idea of human rights. Ibish charges that maintaining Israel as a Jewish state would be to tolerate a pernicious ideology. In fact, it is to recognize that Israeli Jews insist on the same right to national self-determination in their own political space that Palestinians themselves claim in their bid for independence in the West Bank and Gaza. (Note: Ibish’s position on this has radically changed—he had an epiphany and was politically reborn— and he is now affiliated with ATFP, an ally of ours. I need to check with Rafi Dajani and Ibish on his current view of this to insure we respesent his current views accurately while also criticism his previous more radical incarnation, of which he is himself very critical now.)

Ali Abunimah, Vice President of the Arab American Action Network and Electronic Intifada editor, denounces Palestinian moderates like Sari Nusseibeh who believe that the only practicable and just solution to the refugee problem is to realize the right of return in a new state of Palestine in the West Bank and Gaza. Those choosing not to return to Palestine would be provided options of rehabilitation, citizenship and compensation in the states where they reside, resettlement in third countries, or family reunification in Israel on humanitarian grounds for a limited number. Abunimah dubs such solutions “the shredding of fundamental [Palestinian] human rights.” He claims that “the right of return is enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states that ‘Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own and return to his country.’ Decades of international jurisprudence support this principle.”

But Lex Takkenberg, who heads the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East in Gaza, sums up his comprehensive study of The Status of Palestinian Refugees in International Law, published by Oxford University Press, by concluding: “The refugees do have the legal right to return to their ‘own country,’ Palestine. As long as there is no Palestinian state, this right applies in principle to the entire territory of the former British Mandate. However, now that the PLO, as the representative of the Palestinian people, has recognized the right of Israel to exist, it is obvious that the Palestinian refugees will only be able to exercise their right to return in conjunction with their right to self-determination” in a Palestinian state living at peace with Israel. Many scholars of human rights law cited by Takkenberg agree that the right to return referred to in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a “right of nationals to return to the their own country,’ and as the Palestinian refugees are not Israeli nationals, accordingly this does not apply to them.” Most Western and non-Western scholars agree with a UN study of the right to leave and return that the problem of the Palestinian refugees should be solved within the framework of the right to national self-determination in their own state, not through irredentist claims about historic Palestine masked in the lofty rhetoric of human rights.

Renewed political assaults on the legitimacy of Israel, attempts to turn Jews into a minority in a single Palestinian Arab majority-ruled state only move us farther from an end to the national struggle, prolonging the war, and the affliction of both peoples, including Palestinian refugees. No interpretation of human rights law which promised the perpetuation of a national conflict and the destruction of a people’s right to national independence—in this case that of Israeli Jews—could faithfully reflect the tenor of international law, whose overriding goal is peace and justice. Such tactics sabotage the forces of reconciliation in both societies. Israelis refuse to commit national suicide and relinquish their right to a Jewish state, just as Palestinians insist on creating a Muslim, Arab state in the West Bank and Gaza, as reflected in the proposed new Palestinian constitution. The only viable road to peace in our lifetime requires mutual acceptance of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people, as Palestinian and Israeli moderates have recognized. The problem of the Palestinian refugees must be solved in a way that is consistent with the national rights of both peoples.

While firing broadsides against the peace plan devised by Palestinian leader Sari Nusseibeh and former Israeli Shin Bet security service chief Ami Ayalon, Abunimah too objects to Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state, again claiming that both law and justice make such a state illicit: “While virtually all Israelis deny the right of Palestinians to return to their homes, Israel now demands that the Palestinians recognize that Israel has a 'right to exist as a Jewish state.' This has absolutely no basis whatsoever in any law or principle of justice. Even if Palestinians recognize Israel as a Jewish state, no one can grant it a right to maintain a specific demographic composition—a Jewish majority—for eternity. To do so would mean that if the natural processes of population growth, immigration and emigration were to change the demographic composition in a way that interfered with Israel's ‘right’ to have a Jewish majority then Israel would be allowed to alter its own demographic composition.”

Abunimah insists that if

a) Israel has a right to exist as a Jewish state, then this is tantamount to
b) a timeless claim to maintain a Jewish majority; moreover, he argues that this implies that
c) Israel would have the right to engage in “transfer,” or ethnic cleansing and forced sterilization. “After all,” he concludes, “if Israel has a ‘right’ to maintain a Jewish majority, then this right must be enforceable or it is simply meaningless.”

But affirming Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state does not imply acceptance of (b) and (c). Abunimah has simply begged the question by rigging a loaded definition of “Jewish state” which is designed arbitrarily to lead to just the conclusions he seeks to confute. Supporters of Israel as a Jewish state can deny both (b) and (c) and accept that so long as Israel does in fact have a Jewish majority, and as long as this demographic mix is a result of morally defensible policies—which obviously exclude “transfer,” ethnic cleansing or forced sterilization—then it is legitimate, as a matter of both morality and law, for Israel to remain a Jewish state in important respects.

Speaking of the Law of Return, Israel’s ties with the Jewish Diaspora, and the maintenance of a Jewish majority, political scientist Alan Dowty notes that “None of these features is inherently inconsistent with liberal democracy, and none of them are in fact unique to Israel. There are at least two dozen ethnic democracies in the world (among several dozen ethnic states), and a large number of states grant citizenship on the basis of ethnic identity or descent.” Observes Israeli constitutional law scholar Ruth Gavison: “The Jewishness of Israel is, first and foremost, the recognition of the fact that Israel is the state in which the Jewish people exercises its right to national self-determination. Many of the world’s democracies, old and new, have a distinct culture analogous to Israel’s Jewish culture. The constitutions of most European countries reveal that they are nation-states in this sense. These states celebrate their distinct histories, languages, identities, and emblems. Many of their citizens do not share this nationality. But so long as the rights of these citizens are not denied, and so long as they can participate fully in the political and civil life of their societies, we do not deny the democratic nature of the state.” “There is no contradiction between striving to grant the Arabs equality as required by law and decency and the fulfillment of Zionism,” explains Israel’s Attorney General Elyakim Rubinstein. “Whoever wants to preserve Israel as a democratic and Jewish state must strive to grant equality to the Arabs.”

There is no clash between Israel's remaining a haven for persecuted Jews, or inviting free Jewish immigration under the Law of Return, and its becoming fully a state of all its citizens, a principle which guides the jurisprudence of Israel’s Supreme Court Chief Justice Aharon Barak. Just as Israel gives preference to Jews wishing to emigrate to it under the Law of Return, so Palestine will have a Palestinian Law of Return, which gives preference to Palestinians, especially Palestinian refugees, to emigrate into the new polity. Israel is both a Jewish and a liberal democratic state, and liberal democracy requires equality among all citizens, Jewish or Palestinian, in the domestic public sphere where government acts—when it provides education, allocates budget and land, regulates employment, assesses taxes, and imposes the duty on citizens to serve the state through national service. Peace between Israel and Palestine will help remove the main obstacle to equal civic benefits and duties for Israeli Jews and Israeli Palestinians—the ongoing national conflict. Shawki Hatib, a Palestinian Israeli who serves as chairman of the Higher Arab Monitoring Committee, told an Israeli audience in Tel Aviv marking the seventh anniversary of Yitzhak Rabin’s murder that “Rabin was the only Israeli leader who gave hope to Israeli Arabs, the first prime minister to give them equal rights and to promote their civil status.” In the Jewish republic, Israel, living at peace with a Palestinian state, Palestinian citizens will be more apt to enjoy equal citizenship. Equal civic duties means national service for all citizens, including eventually, when conditions permit, service for all Israeli citizens in the Israel Defense Forces which will, with the evolution of peace between Israel and its neighbors, no longer face an Arab army with which it is likely to be at war.

The UN World Conference Against Racism (WCAR) held in Durban, South Africa from August 28th to September 1st 2001 called for “the reinstitution of UN resolution 3379 determining the practices of Zionism as racist practices.” It termed Israel’s laws of return and citizenship discriminatory, designed to “maintain the exclusive nature of the State of Israel as a Jewish state to the exclusion of all other groups.” But the Palestinian law of return will discriminate against non-Palestinians and non-Arabs, including Jews, in just the same way that Israel’s law of return gives preference to Jews.

Yet the Durban declaration further called “upon the international community to impose a policy of complete and total isolation of Israel as an apartheid state as in the case of South Africa which means the imposition of mandatory and comprehensive sanctions and embargoes, the full cessation of all links (diplomatic, economic, social, aid, military cooperation and training) between all states and Israel.” Anti-Zionists who deny the legitimacy only of Jewish national self-determination, while tacitly affirming this right for Palestinian Arabs and other peoples, seek to impale Israel on one or another horn of a false dilemma. Only Israel’s wish to maintain a Jewish nation-state is deemed a moral toxin. If such intolerance towards Jews, and anti-Jewish bias, is not anti-Semitic, it’s hard to imagine what is.
"Original Sin," Israel and the Palestinian Refugees: A Response to the Anti-Zionists
by Gidon D. Remba

People on the left, progressives, are committed to the values of liberalism, equality and human rights. They face the dilemma of how to reconcile these commitments to their attachments to particular groups, whether their own families and friends, ethnic groups to which they belong or nation-states in which they are citizens. Progressive Zionists believe that our commitment to the universal values of liberalism and equality can be reconciled in theory and in practice with our particularist attachments to the Jewish people and to Zionism: we are committed to realizing progressive Zionism.

Those on the left who believe that it is impossible to reconcile the particular and the universal often view “ethnically pure states,” or states which privilege a particular ethnic group, as incapable of developing into true liberal democracies where all citizens are treated equally. Some progressives believe that all forms of ethno-nationalism—not only Jewish nationalism or Zionism—are inherently immoral and irreconcilable with liberal values and universalism. They view all such political movements as “blood and soil nationalism,” a form of “tribalism”.[1] They define ethno-nationalism as “the identification of a nation or people as a descent group,” and as involving “the claim that there exists a certain national territory or homeland which members of the descent group are entitled to control.”[2] They believe that ethnically defined states like Israel usually arise through “genocide or what has come to be called ethnic cleansing recently but is a far older practice: driving out the members of an ethnic group by threat (often reinforced by the reality) of violence.”[3] They cleave to their anti-Zionism as a matter of what to them is high moral principle. Such people of the left frequently make the charge that “Israel …[began] its existence with a massive exercise in ‘ethnic cleansing’ by terror.”[4]

They believe that the inner logic of the “ethnic Jewish state” was manifest in founding acts of ethnic cleansing against the Palestinian population. Historical-political complexities are reduced in their hands to a simple ideological claim, as complex events are bent to accommodate the demands of their “theory”. Hearing their accounts of Israel and the Palestinians, we scarcely appreciate not only how contested the claim of Jewish-Palestinian ethnic cleansing remains among historians, but the degree to which the revisionist findings of Israel’s “new historians” support a more nuanced assessment.

Benny Morris, the historian who has conducted the most extensive and systematic research of new archival sources on Israel’s role in the Palestinian exodus, has concluded that the “The Yishuv [the pre-state Jewish community of Palestine] did not enter the 1948 war with a master plan for expelling the Arabs, nor did its political and military leaders ever adopt such a master plan. What happened was largely haphazard and a result of the war…there was no grand design, no blanket policy of expulsion.”[5] Hostile Palestinian reviews of Morris’ major studies suggest rather that Palestinian academic opinion continues to cleave to the unsubstantiated view that “Palestine’s Arabs were expelled systematically and with premeditation.”[6] Morris responds that the critics “somehow avoid the rich world of nuance and deny multiple causation, and resist or ignore the variety and localism of which much of history, and certainly the 1948 war, is composed…[T]hey prefer their history simple; prefer a single-cause explanation of the Palestinian exodus, with the Zionists cast as systematic premeditating, expulsive devils. From the first, throughout, the Zionists were bent on transfer and expulsion; throughout the Palestinians were hapless, innocent victims…History is one large morality play, with the protagonists carefully separated into heroes and villains, good and bad.”

Instead, Morris concludes his monumental study, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949 with this summation: “[T]he Palestinian refugee problem was born of war, not by design, Jewish or Arab. It was largely a by-product of Arab and Jewish fears and of the protracted, bitter fighting that characterized the first Israeli-Arab war.”[7] While some Palestinians, particularly the middle and upper classes, fled of their own initiative in response to the fighting, it is undeniable that some Palestinians were expelled by Israeli forces; but intent is critical to accurately characterizing such acts and to rendering moral judgment: “The destruction of Palestinian communities and the departure of their inhabitants during this phase of the conflict [Spring 1948] were also a consequence of Zionist military offensives. The first goal of these operations was to block the advance of armies from neighboring Arab states.”[8] Expulsion was decidedly not Israeli policy, as Morris and others have shown, though in some cases orders to remove the population from a battleground originated at the highest levels, and in other cases, particularly in major cities like Haifa and Nazareth, Jewish officials made extensive and successful efforts to persuade Arabs to remain in their homes.[9]

Morris, however, has more recently described some of the Israeli expulsions as “a variety of ethnic cleansing of Arab areas by Jews.”[10] That there were cases in which Israeli forces expelled Palestinians is not contested; what is open to argument is how we should describe and morally assess these acts. Those who view them as morally unjustifiable will deem them instances of “ethnic cleansing.” Those who hold that they admit of some justification will describe these tragic events in different vocabulary. While the Fourth Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949 had not yet been adopted at the time of the Palestinian deportations, it is widely agreed that the forcible transfers of population which Article 49 prohibits “regardless of their motive,” were forbidden as a matter of natural law. The question remains whether in light of the circumstances which obtained in Palestine of 1948 the prohibition admits of any exceptions. Morris has noted that “Arab irregulars were based and quartered in the villages, and as the militias of many villages were participating in the anti-Yishuv [anti-Jewish community] hostilities, the Haganah regarded most of the villages as actively or potentially hostile.”[11] In his memoirs, Yitzhak Rabin describes the dilemma of Jewish forces near the villages of Lod and Ramle facing approaching Egyptian divisions during the war: “Clearly, we could not leave Lod’s hostile and armed populace in our rear, where it could endanger the supply route to the Yiftach (another brigade), which was advancing eastward.”[12]

Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal sum up their study of Palestinian history as follows: “The tragedy [of Palestinian refugees] resulted from a convergence of emotions: the Jewish fear, in the aftermath of the Holocaust and with the mounting attacks in Arab countries against Jews, of what the Arabs would do if they prevailed…the anxiety of Jewish commanders having a hostile population behind their advancing lines during the fighting; … and, not least, the Palestinians own image of what the Jews would do to them if Israel prevailed and they were left in its territory.”[13] The war during which such expulsions occurred, and the motives for their commission, would likely have obtained even if mainstream Zionism had been a movement of civic nationalism proposing a binational Jewish-Arab state in Palestine. For as long as Jewish refugees and other persecuted persons emigrated to Palestine when no other countries would have them, the social and demographic bases for power sharing in a civic state in Palestine would have continued to shift toward the Jewish side, arousing Arab fears. This of course is what happened between Muslims and Christians in Lebanon during the 1970’s and 80’s, and what is happening now between Sunni and Shia Muslims in Iraq.

It is thus naïve and dogmatic to suppose that the first Arab-Israeli war was the exclusive product of the Jewish community’s realization of an ethnic Jewish state under the aegis of the United Nations 1947 partition resolution affirming the creation of separate Jewish and Arab states in Palestine. Palestinian Arab nationalists, and the UN itself, at the time also advocated an ethnic Arab nation-state, not a civic state, and the same holds for Palestinian nationalists today. A Jewish-Arab civil war had been raging in Palestine, and it is most likely that such a war would have ensued even if the Jewish leadership had favored a binational state (as proposed then by Martin Buber and Hannah Arendt, and today by some “post-Zionist” cosmopolitans, and Palestinians like Edward Said). The Arab leadership of Palestine at the time generally opposed even a sharing of power with the Jewish community. Might ethnic war and the creation of refugees have been obviated had both sides embraced the kind of cosmopolitan civic nationalism advocated by anti-Zionist progressives? Perhaps under the most favorable conditions, but in practice all too many non-ethnic states have collapsed into civil war as well, as noted above.

If the “civic nationalism” proposed by anti-Zionist progressives promises no guarantee of avoiding ethnic civil war, it might also be true that under favorable conditions ethnic nation states might avoid such conflicts—particularly ethnic states built around a robust liberal constitutional framework of political and social equality. This possibility, which progressive Zionists believe is both realistically possible and morally necessary, is often overlooked by progressive anti-Zionists. Sixty years later, a two-state solution has again been broached for Palestine-Israel. If it emerges gradually in the coming years, it will result in an ethnic Palestinian Arab state and an ethnic Jewish state, albeit one which has long treated all citizens equally in key spheres of public life (within Israel proper), but is striving to fulfill its founding ideal in other spheres while struggling with ongoing security threats from extremist Muslim groups like Hezbollah and Hamas, and hostile states like Iran (please see the response to Claim 6 below for a fuller discussion of this issue). Indeed, Palestinian leaders now adamantly insist on an ethnically pure state; whereas Israel has a Palestinian minority, the polity desired by Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza will not contain a Jewish minority. The proposition that sovereign borders need not mirror the ethnic identity of communities is repudiated by the Palestinians, who are unwilling to consider an arrangement whereby some Jewish settlements would be evacuated to make way for the resettlement of Palestinian refugees, while others might remain under a Palestinian government which would guarantee the rights of Jews as citizens of the new state, at the same time insuring that water and other resources are allocated equitably between Jewish and Arab communities in the new state.

For anti-Zionist progressives, ethnic cleansing is what ethnic states are wont to do, and such acts can only be defended on illicit “historical-theological” grounds (by invoking claims like “the great evil of the Holocaust ostensibly justifies displacing the Palestinian population”). It is true that such justifications are patently immoral. The dispossession of the Palestinians was a tragic and often unintended product of war, and where intentional its purpose was often associated with defensive requirements to remove from battle areas hostile and armed populations supporting guerrillas; to the extent that such expulsions were not dictated by defensive military needs, they were and are unjustified. But they are best explained by the fears generated in the midst of a terrible war involving five armies advancing on a small territory, than by the “inner logic” of ethnic nationalism.


[1]Brian Barry, “Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmpolitan Critique,” Ian Shapiro and Lea Brilmayer, eds., Global Justice, Nomos XLI (New York: New York University Press, 1999), pp. 12-66.
[2]Ibid., pp. 16-17. There are others on the left who believe, inconsistently, that only Jewish nationalism is immoral, while having little or nothing to say about Palestinian or Arab nationalism, or other national ideologies around the globe. Such views will be addressed below in our response to Claim 5.
[3]Ibid., p. 45.
[4]Ibid., p. 37
[5]Benny Morris, 1948 and After: Israel and the Palestinians (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 17
[6]Ibid., p. 37
[7]Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, p. 286.
[8]Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), pp. 306-307. Chapter 5, “The Palestinian Disaster and the Basic Issues After 1948,” offers a comprehensive and objective assessment of the literature on the causes of the Palestinian refugee problem. Concludes Tessler: “Overall, it seems necessary to conclude that there is no single cause of the Palestinian refugee problem and, accordingly, that there is a mixture of fact and propaganda in both Arab and Israeli arguments. The factors that led Palestinian civilians to leave their homes varied from one location to another. Even more, they varied from one phase of the war to the next.”
[9]Tessler, pp. 306-7.
[10]See Benny Morris, “Arab-Israeli War,” in Roy Gutman and David Rieff, eds., Crimes of War: What the Public Should Know (New York: Norton, 1999), pp. 28-37, esp. p. 32.
[11]Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, p. 62.
[12]Yitzhak Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), p. 383.
[13]Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal, The Palestinians: The Making of a People (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 153.